La narrativa predominante sugiere que América Latina, o mejor dicho, los países latinoamericanos, al no existir una coordinación regional en su postura geopolítica, buscan mantener cierta equidistancia o neutralidad para evitar alinearse con una de las dos potencias globales y verse arrastrados por esta rivalidad. Sin embargo, ¿respaldan los datos esta narrativa de la geopolítica latinoamericana?
Resumen
La postura geopolítica de los países latinoamericanos con respecto a las dos potencias globales dominantes, EE. UU. y China, no es de neutralidad, pero tampoco responde al deseo de evitar alinearse con una de las dos potencias globales para mantener el equilibrio.
Como se refleja en las votaciones sobre las Resoluciones de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, la postura geopolítica de los países latinoamericanos —con la notoria excepción de Cuba, Nicaragua y Venezuela— se alinea con diferentes bloques en diferentes temas. En términos de valores (derechos humanos, soberanía e integridad territorial), lo hacen con EE. UU. y la UE; en términos de intereses económicos (comercio y desarrollo, y sanciones económicas), lo hacen con China y sus pares emergentes. Además, esta postura geopolítica es independiente de las inclinaciones políticas del gobierno en el poder.
The US-China rivalry and Latin American geopolitics: from narrative to data
Theme
The predominant narrative suggests that Latin America, or rather the countries of Latin America, since there is no regional coordination in their geopolitical stance, seek to maintain a certain equidistance or neutrality to avoid aligning themselves with one of the two global powers and being dragged down by this rivalry. However, do the data support this narrative of Latin American geopolitics?
Summary
The geopolitical stance of Latin American countries with respect to the two dominant global powers, the US and China, is not one of neutrality, but nor does it respond to a desire to avoid aligning with one of the two global powers to maintain a balance.
As reflected in the votes on the Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the geopolitical stance of the countries of Latin America –with the notorious exception of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela– aligns with different blocs on different issues. In terms of Values (Human Rights, and Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity) they do so with the US and the EU, in terms of Economic Interests (Trade and Development, and Economic Sanctions) they do so with China and their emerging peers. Furthermore, this geopolitical stance is independent of the political leanings of whatever the government in power.
Analysis[1]
Although the US is the dominant power, both in military terms (to whose resources in this domain must be added the density of its security alliances) and economic and technological power (it is still the largest economy on the planet, it is at the forefront of frontier technologies and the dollar is the global currency with no competitors in sight), China has increasingly become a formidable competitor in the three dimensions. Moreover, both are at a significant distance from other competitors in global power distribution. The EU has an economic dimension comparable to that of the US and China but is neither a military nor technological power of similar magnitude. Russia has a military power comparable to that of the US and China (even greater than China’s if nuclear weapons are considered) but is neither an economic nor technological power of similar magnitude.
The US-China rivalry differs from the Cold War in at least two dimensions. First, because the strategic competition, rivalry or confrontation, as we prefer to call it, between the US and China is limited to the economic and technological spheres, but is not yet as evident in the ideological and military spheres, as was the case with the USSR, when the global powers confronted each other militarily in different parts of the world through their domestic proxies in an ideological struggle.[2]
Secondly, although the USSR equalled and, according to some indicators, even surpassed the US in military power, its economic power never matched that of China in relation to the US. In contrast to China, interdependence (measured through trade and investment flows between the dominant powers) was practically non-existent during the Cold War. With the exception of trade with the Warsaw Pact countries (the countries in its sphere of influence), the USSR had hardly any economic ties with today’s so-called emerging economies. In contrast, China is today the most important trading partner for more than 100 emerging countries, particularly in Latin America, including Brazil and Argentina. And despite recent setbacks, more than 150 emerging countries are part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
- 1. Values and interests
We are in a world with two global powers combining military, economic and technological might, with no rivals in sight. And as was the case during the Cold War, both represent antagonistic forms of organisation of society in terms of fundamental values: democracy, freedom, the rule of law and the respect for human rights.
In this global geopolitical context, democratic, developed and emerging countries alike, including most of Latin America, face a dilemma regarding their geopolitical stance: how to balance interests and values in a context in which authoritarian governments, especially China, are gaining economic and technological influence and military power. The dilemma is particularly complex for Latin America, the emerging region most aligned with Western values (see Figure 1), but whose economic interests, in many cases, are strongly conditioned by trade and/or financial and/or investment ties with China.
- The geopolitics of Latin America: the narrative
The predominant narrative suggests that Latin America, or rather the countries of Latin America since there is no regional coordination in the geopolitical stance, try to maintain a certain balance or neutrality to avoid aligning themselves with one of the two global powers and being dragged down by this rivalry.
However, do the data support this account of Latin American geopolitics?
- The geopolitics of Latin America: the sample
To answer this question, we consider as an indicator of the geopolitical stance of Latin American countries their votes in the Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly according to the following criteria:
Those voted between 2001 and 2023.
Those where the Western bloc (the US and the EU) voted jointly and in an opposing position with respect to China.[3]
Those representing Values (Human Rights, and Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity) and those representing Economic Interests (Trade and Development, and Economic Sanctions).
With these criteria we obtain a total of 31 Resolutions classified as follows:
Human Rights: 11.
Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity: 4.
Trade and Development: 12.
Economic Sanctions: 4.
For the purposes of analysis, we consider that Resolutions on Human Rights and on Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity fall into the category of Values. Those concerning trade and development and economic sanctions fall into the Economic Interests category.
- The geopolitics of Latin America: what the data say
If the hypothesis of neutrality or geopolitical balance were an accurate description of reality, we would expect that most Latin American countries would abstain from voting on resolutions in the UN General Assembly that, by sample construction, place the US and the Western bloc in the opposite corner of China.
As an alternative to the hypothesis of neutrality or balance narrative, it could be that Latin American countries:
Align themselves in most of the Resolutions with one of the two global powers.
Pursue their own national interest by aligning themselves with different blocs on different issues.
These are the results obtained for the total of 31 Resolutions considered in the sample:
EU countries vote overwhelmingly with the US (this by sample construction) both for the total number of resolutions (91% of EU countries vote with the US for the average of 31 resolutions) and for the two subcategories of Values (100%) and Economic Interests (82%) (see Figure 2).
Developed countries vote overwhelmingly with the US and the EU for the total number of resolutions considered (88%). The same is true for the subcategories of Values (100%) and Economic Interests (75.5%) (see Figure 2).
Russia aligns with China in the total number of resolutions considered (96.9%). It also does so in the two subcategories of Values (100%) and Economic Interests (92.8%) (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Voting in UN General Assembly Resolutions (% of countries aligned with the US and China, average of Resolutions voted between 2001 and 2023)
| Total (simple average) | % US | % China |
| EU | 91 | 9 |
| Developed Economies | 87.8 | 12.2 |
| Russia | 3.1 | 96.9 |
| Total (Values) | % US | % China |
| EU | 100 | 0 |
| Developed Economies | 100 | 0 |
| Russia | 0 | 100 |
| Total (Economic Interests) | % US | % China |
| EU | 82 | 18 |
| Developed Economies | 75.5 | 24.5 |
| Russia | 6.2 | 93.8 |
Notes: the Resolutions included in Values refer to Human Rights, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity; the Resolutions included in Economic Interests refer to Trade and Development and Economic Sanctions; abstentions were considered as votes in favour of the US for the EU and Developed Economies, and as votes in favour of China in the case of Russia, since the rationale for abstaining is similar to that used by the US or China when justifying a vote in favour or against a Resolution. Source: the authors based on United Nations data.
The democratic countries of Latin America (excluding Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, the three authoritarian governments in the region) are mostly aligned with the Western bloc when it comes to resolutions on Values: Human Rights and Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity. On average, 86.3% of democratic countries voted with the US and the EU in resolutions on Human Rights (2% with China) and 61% in those referring to Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity (14% with China) (see Figure 3).
Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela aligned with China and Russia in most of the resolutions on Values and never do so with the US and the EU (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Voting in UN General Assembly Resolutions (% of countries aligned with the US and China, average of Resolutions voted between 2001 and 2023)
| Values | % US | % China | % Average |
| Democratic Latin America | 79.5 | 5 | 15.5 |
| Cuba | 0 | 84.6 | 15.4 |
| Nicaragua | 0 | 90 | 10 |
| Venezuela | 0 | 80 | 20 |
| Human Rights | % US | % China | % Average |
| Democratic Latin America | 86.3 | 2 | 11.7 |
| Cuba | 0 | 84.6 | 15.4 |
| Nicaragua | 0 | 90 | 10 |
| Venezuela | 0 | 80 | 20 |
| Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity | % US | % China | % Average |
| Democratic Latin America | 61 | 14 | 25 |
| Cuba | 0 | 84.6 | 15.4 |
| Nicaragua | 0 | 90 | 10 |
| Venezuela | 0 | 80 | 20 |
Notes: Resolutions on Values refer to Human Rights, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity; Democratic Latin America excludes Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. Source: the authors based on United Nations data.
Democratic Latin America’s alignment with the Western bloc and with the rest of the developed countries according to shared values, is similar among left/centre-left and right/centre-right governments in the region. The percentage of left/centre-left and right/centre-right governments aligned with the Western bloc in the resolutions on Values is 74% and 84%, respectively. Only 10% and 4%, respectively, do so with China (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Voting in UN General Assembly Resolutions (% of governments aligned with the US and China, average of Resolutions voted between 2001 and 2023)
| Values | % US | % China | % Average |
| Left/Centre-left | 74 | 10 | 16 |
| Right/Centre-right | 84 | 4 | 12 |
| Centre | 88 | 0 | 12 |
Notes: Resolutions on Values refer to Human Rights, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity. Source: the authors based on United Nations data.
The voting patterns of Brazil and Mexico, the two major countries in the region, do not differ substantially from those observed for Democratic Latin America as a whole. In terms of Values, 60% and 80% of the resolutions are aligned with the US and the Western bloc, respectively. In no case did they do so with China (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. Voting in UN General Assembly Resolutions (% of Resolutions in which Mexico and Brazil align with the US and China, average of Resolutions voted between 2001 and 2023)
| Values | % US | % China | % Average |
| Mexico | 80 | 0 | 20 |
| Brazil | 60 | 0 | 40 |
Notes: Resolutions on Values refer to Human Rights, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity. Source: the authors based on United Nations data.
Latin America is the most western of the emerging regions, with the sole exception of Emerging Europe, whose countries are all EU aspirants. In terms of Values, 79.5% of Latin American countries align themselves with the Western bloc, to a much greater extent than the rest of the emerging regions: Middle East and North Africa (37%), Sub-Saharan Africa (25%), Former Soviet Republics (24.5%) and Emerging Asia (19%) (see Figure 6).
Figure 6. Voting in UN General Assembly Resolutions (% of countries aligned with the US and China, average of Resolutions voted between 2001 and 2023)
| Values | % US | % China | % Average |
| Emerging Europe | 95.5 | 1 | 3.5 |
| Democratic Latin America | 79.5 | 5 | 15.5 |
| Middle East and North Africa | 37 | 31 | 32 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 25 | 23.5 | 51.5 |
| Former Soviet Republics | 24.5 | 69 | 6.5 |
| Emerging Asia | 19 | 43 | 38 |
Notes: Resolutions on Values refer to Human Rights, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity; Latin America excludes Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. Source: the authors based on United Nations data.
Most Democratic Latin American countries are aligned with China on resolutions related to Economic Interests: Trade and Development and Economic Sanctions. 95,5% of Latin American countries vote with China in the resolutions related to Trade and Development and 97% in those related to Economic Sanctions (see Figure 7).
Even Paraguay and Guatemala, the only two democratic countries considered in the sample that still maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, vote with the US and the Western bloc on Values and with China and its emerging peers on Economic Interests.
Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, the three authoritarian governments in the region, align themselves with China and Russia on most resolutions concerning Economic Interests and never do so with the US (see Figure 7).
Figure 7. Voting in UN General Assembly Resolutions (% of countries aligned with the US and China, average of Resolutions voted Between 2001 and 2023)
| Economic Interests | % US | % China | % Average |
| Democratic Latin America | 5.5 | 92 | 2.5 |
| Cuba | 0 | 93.7 | 6.3 |
| Nicaragua | 0 | 93.3 | 6.7 |
| Venezuela | 0 | 92.3 | 7.7 |
| Trade and Development | % US | % China | % Average |
| Democratic Latin America | 7.3 | 90.5 | 2.2 |
| Cuba | 0 | 91.7 | 8.3 |
| Nicaragua | 0 | 91.7 | 8.3 |
| Venezuela | 0 | 90 | 10 |
| Economic Sanctions | % US | % China | % Average |
| Democratic Latin America | 0 | 97 | 3 |
| Cuba | 0 | 100 | 0 |
| Nicaragua | 0 | 100 | 0 |
| Venezuela | 0 | 100 | 0 |
Notes: the Resolutions included in Economic Interests refer to Trade and Development, as well as Economic Sanctions; Democratic Latin America excludes Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. Source: the authors based on United Nations data.
The majority alignment with China and the rest of the emerging regions in terms of Economic Interests does not differ between left/centre-left and right/centre-right governments. The percentage of left/centre-left and right/centre-right governments aligned with China on Economic Interests is 93.3% and 91%, respectively (see Figure 8).
Figure 8. Voting in UN General Assembly Resolutions (% of governments aligned with the US and China, average of Resolutions voted between 2001 and 2023)
| Economic Interests | % US | % China | % Average |
| Left/Centre-left | 5.2 | 93.2 | 1.5 |
| Right/Centre-right | 5 | 91 | 4 |
| Centre | 13 | 87 | 0 |
Note: the Resolutions included in Economic Interests refer to Trade and Development, as well as Economic Sanctions. Source: the authors based on United Nations data.
The voting pattern of Brazil and Mexico, the two major countries in Latin America, does not differ substantially from that observed for Democratic Latin America. In terms of Economic Interests, they are aligned in 86.7% and 81.3% of the votes with China and the rest of the emerging economies (see Figure 9).
Figure 9. Voting in UN General Assembly Resolutions (% of Resolutions in which Mexico and Brazil align with the Votes of the US and China, average of Resolutions voted between 2001 and 2023)
| Economic Interests | % US | % China | % Average |
| Mexico | 6.2 | 81.3 | 12.5 |
| Brazil | 6.7 | 86.7 | 6.7 |
Note: the Resolutions included in Economic Interests refer to Trade and Development, as well as Economic Sanctions. Source: the authors based on United Nations data.
In terms of Economic Interests, all emerging regions are mostly aligned with China: Latin America (92% of countries), Emerging Asia (95%), Middle East and North Africa (93%), Sub-Saharan Africa (94.2%) and the Former Soviet Republics (93.8%). The only exception is Emerging Europe, which tends to align with China in only 28.2% of cases (see Figure 10).
Figure 10. Voting in UN General Assembly Resolutions (% of countries aligned with the US and China, average of Resolutions voted between 2001 and 2023)
| Economic Interests | % US | % China | % Average |
| Emerging Europe | 33.5 | 28.2 | 38.2 |
| Former Soviet Republics | 6.2 | 93.8 | 0 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 5.8 | 94.2 | 0 |
| Democratic Latin America | 5.5 | 92 | 2.5 |
| Emerging Asia | 4 | 95 | 1 |
| Middle East and North Africa | 0 | 93 | 7 |
Notes: the Resolutions included in Economic Interests refer to Trade and Development, as well as Economic Sanctions; Latin America excludes Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. Source: the authors based on United Nations data.
Conclusions
Using a sample of 31 resolutions representing Values (Human Rights, and Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity) and Economic Interests (Trade and Development, and Economic Sanctions) voted in the UN General Assembly between 2001 and 2023, and in which the US (and the EU) voted on the opposite side to China (and Russia), Latin America’s geopolitical stance displays the following characteristics:
The democratic countries of Latin America align themselves with one bloc or the other according to their national interests. Their geopolitical stance does not respond to the desire to avoid aligning themselves with one of the two global powers and thus maintain a certain neutrality or balance. The data reveal that the democratic countries of Latin America align themselves mostly with the US, the EU, the rest of the developed countries and Emerging Europe (in the latter case all of them aspiring to join the EU), when it comes to resolutions referring to Values (Human Rights, and Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity); and they align themselves mostly with China and their emerging peers when it comes to resolutions referring to Economic Interests (Trade and Development, and Economic Sanctions).
The geopolitical stance of Brazil and Mexico, the two major countries in Latin America, does not differ substantially from that observed for the rest of the democratic countries in the region. In terms of Values they align with the US and the Western bloc (to a greater extent Mexico than Brazil) and in terms of Economic Interests they align with China and the rest of the emerging economies (despite the fact that Mexico’s trade ties are stronger with the US and Brazil’s with China).
Paraguay and Guatemala, despite being the only two democratic countries considered in the sample that still maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, exhibit the same voting pattern as the rest of the democratic countries in the region: they align with the US and the Western bloc on Values and with China and its emerging peers on Economic Interests.
Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, the three authoritarian governments in the region, are in all cases aligned with China and Russia, both in resolutions on Values and those related to Economic Interests.
The geopolitical stance of democratic countries in Latin America cuts across governments of different ideologies. The voting pattern in UN General Assembly Resolutions tends to be very similar regardless of whether the governments are left/centre-left or right/centre-right, both on issues of Values and Economic Interests. In other words, political polarisation does not seem to contaminate the geopolitical stance of the countries in the region.
Latin America is by far (except for Emerging Europe) the most western of the emerging regions in terms of Values (Human Rights, and Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity).
In short, the geopolitical stance of Latin American countries with respect to the two great centres of global power, the US and China, is not one of neutrality, nor does it respond to the desire to avoid aligning themselves with one of the two powers in order to maintain a balance. As reflected in the votes of the countries of the region in the Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the geopolitical stance of the countries of Latin America –with the notorious exception of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela– pursues national interest by aligning with the different blocs on different issues, and they do so independently of the political sign of the government of the day.
A recent example clearly illustrates this pattern of Latin American geopolitics: the war in Ukraine. In the resolutions condemning the violation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty, most democratic Latin American countries aligned themselves with the US and the Western bloc in condemning the invasion and only a minority did so with China and Russia. However, following what has been the historical tradition of its voting in UN Resolutions, Latin America did not support economic sanctions against Russia.
This pattern of Latin America geopolitics has relevant practical implications. If the West intends to mitigate China’s growing influence in Latin America in trade, finance and investment, it must offer an attractive menu of opportunities in these areas of strategic interest for the region, as the EU is doing with the launching of the Global Gateway, the modernisation of its association agreements with Chile and Mexico, and the political decision to move forward to conclude the EU-Mercosur agreement.
If China aspires to bring Latin America into line with its international political stance, it will be difficult to find an echo in a region with strong roots in democratic values and the respect for human rights.
Appendix I. Sample of countries and regions
| Countries | EU | Emerging Europe |
| US | Germany | Turkey |
| China | France | Serbia |
| Russia | Italy | Ukraine |
| Spain | Bosnia and Herzegovina | |
| Belgium | Albania | |
| The Netherlands | North Macedonia | |
| Poland | ||
| Sweden | ||
| Sub Saharan Africa | Middle East and North Africa | Latin America |
| Nigeria | Saudi Arabia | Argentina |
| South Africa | Iran | Bolivia |
| Kenya | United Arab Emirates | Brazil |
| Ethiopia | Egypt | Chile |
| Angola | Iraq | Colombia |
| Ghana | Qatar | Costa Rica |
| Tanzania | Argelia | Cuba |
| Côte d’Ivoire | Kuwait | Dominican Republic |
| DR Congo | Morocco | Ecuador |
| Cameroon | El Salvador | |
| Uganda | Guatemala | |
| Senegal | Honduras | |
| Mexico | ||
| Nicaragua | ||
| Panama | ||
| Paraguay | ||
| Peru | ||
| Uruguay | ||
| Venezuela | ||
| Developed Economies | Former Soviet Republics | Emerging Asia |
| Japan | Kazakhstan | India |
| UK | Belarus | Indonesia |
| Canada | Uzbekistan | Thailand |
| Australia | Philippines | |
| Republic of Korea | Malaysia | |
| Israel | Bangladesh | |
| Switzerland | Vietnam | |
| Norway |
Notes: the countries from the EU, Developed Economies, Emerging Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America, Former Soviet Republics, and Emerging Europe included in the sample account for more than 80% of the GDP of the corresponding bloc.
Appendix II. List of Resolutions
Human Rights
Resolution A/RES/56/174 – 2001
Resolution A/RES/57/232 – 2002
Resolution A/RES/61/175 – 2006
Resolution A/RES/63/245 – 2008
Resolution A/RES/64/175 – 2009
Resolution A/RES/69/188 – 2014
Resolution A/RES/73/264 – 2018
Resolution A/RES/75/238 – 2020
Resolution A/RES/ES-11/3 – 2022
Resolution A/RES/77/228 – 2022
Resolution A/RES/77/230 – 2022
Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity
Resolution A/RES/68/262 – 2014
Resolution A/RES/72/190 – 2017
Resolution A/RES/ES-11/1 – 2022
Resolution A/RES/ES-11/5 – 2022
Trade and Development
Resolution A/RES/62/161 – 2007
Resolution A/RES/63/178 – 2008
Resolution A/RES/65/142 – 2010
Resolution A/RES/67/219 – 2012
Resolution A/RES/67/202 – 2012
Resolution A/RES/69/207 – 2014
Resolution A/RES/72/203 – 2017
Resolution A/RES/73/336 – 2019
Resolution A/RES/75/232 – 2020
Resolution A/RES/77/174 – 2022
Resolution A/RES/77/338 – 2023
Economic Sanctions
Resolution A/RES/62/183 – 2007
Resolution A/RES/76/191 – 2021
Resolution A/RES/77/214 – 2022
[1] This is an adaptation of a paper originally published in Spanish on 6 February 2024.
[2] This does not mean, of course, that we are unaware of the underlying tensions in relation to Taiwan.
[3] We consider the EU voted with the US when more than 80% of EU countries did so.
VIETNAM NUCLEAR: BUSCA APOYO DEL PRIMER MINISTRO RUSO PARA IMPULSAR SU PROGRAMA DE ENERGÍA NUCLEAR
La cúpula vietnamita ha buscado el compromiso de Rusia con el desarrollo del programa de energía nuclear en Vietnam durante la visita a Hanói del primer ministro ruso, Mikhail Vladimirovich Mishustin.
Mishustin y su homólogo vietnamita, Pham Minh Chinh, se reunieron en Hanói y presenciaron la firma de un memorándum de entendimiento en cooperación en energía nuclear entre las empresas Vietnam Electricity y la estatal rusa de energía nuclear Rosatom, publica la agencia de noticias de Vietnam.
El director general de Rosatom, Alexey Likhachev, estuvo en Hanói, un día antes de que llegara a la urbe vietnamita el primer ministro ruso, y aseguró durante una reunión con Pham Minh Chinh que la corporación está «lista» para cooperar y asistir a Vietnam en la construcción de plantas de energía nuclear y en otros ámbitos de la industria, según el citado medio.
Vietnam busca reiniciar su programa de energía nuclear, tras tenerlo suspendido durante años, para impulsar su creciente sector industrial y reducir las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero.
Ya durante la visita a Vietnam del presidente ruso Vladímir Putin en junio del pasado año ambas partes firmaron una decena de acuerdos, entre ellos de energía, y se comprometieron a mejorar su cooperación en defensa.
Según publicó el periódico del Partido Comunista vietnamita a propósito de su visita, Rosatom prevé crear un centro para la energía y las tecnologías nucleares en Vietnam, que no se ha confirmado de momento.
El medio estatal vietnamita VOV (Voz de Vietnam) se hace eco asimismo de unos comentarios la víspera del ministro de Exteriores ruso, Serguéi Lavrov, desde Moscú, donde indicó, señala, que la colaboración en energía nuclear con Vietnam podría extenderse más allá del apoyo a construir una planta, y que la firma de acuerdos al respecto sería un resultado positivo de la visita de Mishustin.
Mishustin también se reunió en Hanói con el secretario general del Partido Comunista de Vietnam, To Lam, la máxima autoridad del país.
Vietnam, que mantiene una política exterior apodada «diplomacia de bambú» por su capacidad para mantener buenas relaciones con las grandes potencias sin tomar partido por ninguna, se ha abstenido en las resoluciones de Naciones Unidas que condenaban la invasión de Ucrania.
El país asiático se ha apoyado en Rusia para la compra de armamento en las últimas décadas y su dependencia en este área sigue siendo clave, pese a que en los últimos años ha tratado de diversificar sus proveedores de equipamiento militar.
VIETNAM GOES NUCLEAR: SEEKS SUPPORT FROM RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER TO BOOST ITS NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM
Vietnamese leaders have sought Russia’s commitment to the development of Vietnam’s nuclear energy program during Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Vladimirovich Mishustin’s visit to Hanoi.
Mishustin and his Vietnamese counterpart, Pham Minh Chinh, met the day before in Hanoi and witnessed the signing of a memorandum of understanding on nuclear energy cooperation between Vietnam Electricity and the Russian state-owned nuclear energy company Rosatom, the Vietnam News Agency reports.
Rosatom CEO Alexey Likhachev was in Hanoi before the Russian prime minister arrived in the Vietnamese city and assured during a meeting with Pham Minh Chinh that the corporation is «ready» to cooperate and assist Vietnam in the construction of nuclear power plants and other industrial areas, according to the aforementioned media outlet.
Vietnam is seeking to restart its nuclear energy program, after having it suspended for years, to boost its growing industrial sector and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
During Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Vietnam in June of last year, both parties signed a dozen agreements, including energy agreements, and pledged to enhance their defense cooperation.
LOS SUBMARINOS CHINOS SON AUTÉNTICAS JAULAS DE GRILLOS: UNA NUEVA GENERACIÓN PROMETE CAMBIAR LAS REGLAS DEL JUEGO
Los actuales submarinos chinos tienen capacidad para misiles nucleares, pero son extremadamente ruidosos.
La modernización militar de China va más allá de los portaviones o los nuevos cazas. Sí, estos son elementos de superioridad en el campo de batalla, también de disuasión y el país está invirtiendo mucho en modernizar y ampliar su flota, pero algo en lo que también están poniendo esfuerzos es en la renovación de sus submarinos con capacidad nuclear.
Después de un no muy exitoso Tipo 094, China está ultimando el submarino nuclear Tipo 096. Y, claro, tienen la atención de sus principales rivales en un escenario que recuerda a la Guerra Fría.
Reforzando la presencia marítima. La modernización de los principales brazos militares se ha convertido en una de las estrategias principales del gobierno de Xi Jinping. Estamos viendo avances en todos los ámbitos, con ejemplos como nuevo armamento terrestre, desarrollo de barcos furtivos, los mencionados portaaviones con el Fujian electromagnético a la cabeza, helicópteros pesados, cazas y hasta armamento espacial.
La pata que podía estar más coja en la Armada china es la de los submarinos de misiles balísticos, o SSBN por sus siglas en inglés. No sólo tenían pocos, sino que sus diseños y funcionamiento no tenía nada que ver con el de las potencias más avanzadas en este contexto. Muestra de ello es el Tipo 094 de comienzos de siglo.
Tipo 094. Buscando cerrar la brecha con Estados Unidos y mantener una persuasiva presencia en el mar de China Meridional, el país lanzó a los mares el Tipo 094. Se trata de un submarino con capacidad de carga de misiles balísticos de propulsión nuclear y fue el sucesor del Tipo 092 de mediados de la década de 1980. Se estima que hay seis unidades activas de este submarino, pero es una nave con luces y sombras.
Si bien sus ojivas nucleares pueden llegar a la costa estadounidense desde el mar de China Meridional, el principal objetivo de estos submarinos es la disuasión y la presencia furtiva (eludiendo la detección de radares y sistemas enemigos). El problema es que es tan ruidoso como los submarinos soviéticos y estadounidenses de la década de 1970. Para un submarino “nuevo”, era un punto flaco evidente porque lo hacía muy visible a las tecnologías antisubmarinas de Estados Unidos y sus aliados.
Y el Tipo 096. El motivo de este ruido es que su sistema de propulsión está desfasado (inspirado en la tecnología soviética de la Guerra Fría) y el diseño del casco, las hélices y el sistema de aislamiento hacen que sea totalmente ineficaz en misiones furtivas. China ha lanzado variantes más silenciosas, como el Tipo 094A, pero siguen siendo demasiado ruidosos. Un blanco fácil en la guerra antisubmarina actual, vaya.
Ahí es donde el Tipo 096 entra en escena. Se espera que haya otros seis submarinos de esta clase con el doble de desplazamiento en toneladas y el doble de capacidad para misiles balísticos, pero más que por sus mejoras para el combate, lo que China está buscando es que solucione el problema del antecesor. Así, el Tipo 096 espera ser tan sigiloso como los submarinos rusos más modernos. También irá cargado con mejoras en la detección de submarinos rivales.
Desafíos. Parte de los esfuerzos del diseño se han destinado a amortiguar el ruido de los motores, como indican en SCMP. Se especula que, de forma similar a los nuevos submarinos rusos, los motores están montados sobre enormes soportes de goma que ayudan a opacar el sonido. Y también se estima que estará listo para finales de esta década.
Ahora bien, aunque tienen a Rusia y la cartera a su favor, la experiencia es un grado y, precisamente, es lo que le falta a china en materia de SSBN. Rusia y Estados Unidos tienen décadas de experiencia en este ámbito y habrá que ver cuando el Tipo 096 entre en juego si China ha logrado ese salto que busca en diseño de submarinos nucleares.
CHINESE SUBMARINES ARE REAL CRICKET CAGES: A NEW GENERATION PROMISES TO CHANGE THE RULES OF THE GAME
Current Chinese submarines are capable of nuclear missiles, but they are extremely noisy.
China’s military modernization goes beyond aircraft carriers or new fighters. Yes, these are elements of superiority on the battlefield, also of deterrence, and the country is investing a lot in modernizing and expanding its fleet, but something they are also putting efforts into is renewing their nuclear-capable submarines.
After a not very successful Type 094, China is finalizing the Type 096 nuclear submarine. And, of course, they have the attention of their main rivals in a scenario reminiscent of the Cold War.
Strengthening the maritime presence. The modernization of the main military arms has become one of the main strategies of Xi Jinping’s government. We are seeing progress in all areas, with examples such as new land weapons, development of stealth ships, the aforementioned aircraft carriers with the electromagnetic Fujian at the helm, heavy helicopters, fighters and even space weapons.
Monitor Indo-Pacific®
Editor: LW, senior fellow of REDCAEM (Red China – América Latina) and CESCOS (Center for the Study of Open Contemporary Societies)
Contact: iw@2049.cl
Bilingual weekly media outlet focusing on geopolitical topics around the Indo-Pacific space.
