As NATO prepares for its upcoming summit, debates over the scope of the alliance’s global partnerships — particularly with the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4), comprising Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea — have gained renewed urgency. The absence of IP4 leaders at the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, alongside reports of US reluctance to formalise the IP4 role at the Ankara Summit, highlights an emerging pattern of selective engagement.
NATO’s engagement with the IP4 has shifted from tentative dialogue to cautious operationalisation. Yet the trajectory of this partnership is neither linear nor assured. It is shaped by two intersecting dynamics. One dynamic is the gradual retrenchment and reprioritisation of US strategic commitments. Another is the emergence of more hedging-oriented European approaches to China and the Indo-Pacific. Together, these trends are transforming the NATO-IP4 relationship from a symbol of alliance globalisation into a more selective and functionally driven form of minilateral cooperation. This push and pull between US pressure for greater burden-sharing and European reluctance to escalate tensions with China forms the central dynamic shaping NATO-IP4 cooperation.
From strategic curiosity to functional cooperation: the rise of minilateralism
NATO’s initial engagement with its Indo-Pacific partners was largely political. In the early 2010s, cooperation centred on shared values, consultations, and crisis management, often framed around global security governance. The post-2014 deterioration of relations with Russia and, more decisively, the post-2022 strategic environment have changed this calculus.
China’s growing strategic profile has been central to this shift. NATO’s identification of China as a “systemic challenge” has catalysed a re-evaluation of geographic boundaries and operational priorities. At the same time, Indo-Pacific partners increasingly view NATO as a relevant actor, not in the sense of a military force in Asia, but as a node within a wider US-centred alliance system.
The result is a transition from dialogue to cooperation, particularly in the domains of maritime security, emerging technologies, and resilience in the global commons. Examples include NATO-IP4 cooperation on cyber defence exercises, coordination on supply chain resilience, and information-sharing on critical technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum systems. Joint statements have further emphasised maritime domain awareness and resilience against hybrid threats. This reflects a broader trend in contemporary security politics towards issue-specific, flexible arrangements that complement, even as they complicate, formal alliance structures.
The NATO-IP4 partnership exemplifies a wider shift towards minilateralism: a form of small-group, issue-specific cooperation among like-minded states designed to bypass the inefficiencies and political constraints of large multilateral institutions while avoiding the rigidity of formal alliances. These institutions have proven too politically constrained to address emerging security challenges, particularly those involving China, while traditional alliances remain geographically bounded and politically sensitive. Minilateral formats — whether NATO-IP4, the Quad, or EU-led security partnerships — offer a pragmatic middle path, enabling cooperation among like-minded actors without requiring consensus across all alliance members or full institutional integration.
For Europe, minilateralism has been particularly attractive. European states are neither passive followers of US strategy nor autonomous strategic actors capable of shaping Indo-Pacific security on their own. Instead, they occupy an intermediate position as “middle powers”, leveraging niche capabilities such as naval diplomacy, regulatory influence, and technological expertise to shape outcomes at the margins of great power competition. The NATO-IP4 framework fits squarely within this pattern. It allows European allies to engage in the Indo-Pacific without formalising a global NATO role that many remain reluctant to endorse.
US retrenchment, European hedging, and China’s response
The evolution of NATO’s Indo-Pacific engagement must be understood in the context of shifting US strategy. Washington’s approach has combined a stronger rhetorical and military focus on the Indo-Pacific with growing pressure on European allies to assume greater responsibility for Euro-Atlantic defence. This is reflected in US calls for higher NATO defence spending targets — driving the revised commitment to 5 per cent of GDP — reduced forward presence expectations in Europe, and an emphasis on enabling allies rather than leading operations. At the same time, US support for NATO-IP4 engagement has been uneven. It has been strong in strategic documents, but more cautious in practice, particularly where Indo-Pacific cooperation risks overextending NATO or provoking China unnecessarily.
This dynamic creates what might be described as “goal displacement” at the periphery of the US alliance system. Allies are increasingly tasked with roles that extend beyond their traditional regional mandates. European NATO members are expected to contribute to Indo-Pacific stability, while Asian allies are drawn into Euro-Atlantic contingencies, particularly in relation to the war in Ukraine. The NATO-IP4 partnership reflects this dual pressure: it is less about NATO projecting power into Asia than about integrating the peripheries of the US alliance system into a more cohesive network. However, differences in threat perception, capacity, and political will continue to constrain deeper integration.
If US retrenchment pushes towards greater cross-regional integration, European hedging pulls in the opposite direction. European Indo-Pacific strategies are increasingly visible, but they also remain cautious and often ambiguous: a reflection of a fundamental tension in Europe’s position within US-China competition. On the one hand, European states share US concerns about China’s role in reshaping international order, particularly in areas such as maritime security, cyber governance, and critical infrastructure. On the other hand, they remain economically interdependent with China and wary of escalating confrontation.
As a result, Europe’s Indo-Pacific engagement has emphasised selective presence rather than sustained commitment. Naval deployments, for example, serve both signalling and diplomatic functions: France’s regular Indo-Pacific patrols, Germany’s frigate deployments, and UK carrier strike group operations demonstrate commitment but stop short of sustained force. Similarly, European participation in technology and standard-setting initiatives reflects an effort to shape rather than decouple from global networks — particularly through initiatives in digital governance, artificial intelligence, and critical infrastructure.
Within NATO, this translates into a cautious approach to the IP4 partnership. While there is broad support for cooperation on non-traditional security issues such as cyber defence, space, and critical technologies, there is less consensus on expanding NATO’s operational footprint or framing China as a direct military adversary.
China’s response to NATO’s Indo-Pacific engagement is a critical part of the equation. From Beijing’s perspective, NATO’s outreach reinforces concerns about encirclement and the extension of transatlantic security structures into Asia. Rather than seeking direct confrontation, however, China has pursued a form of defensive revisionism — incremental efforts to reshape the status quo while avoiding actions that would trigger full-scale counterbalancing. This includes activities such as island-building in the South China Sea and the gradual expansion of maritime presence in contested areas such as the Arctic, calibrated to remain below the threshold of open conflict.
In this context, NATO-IP4 cooperation carries both risks and opportunities. It may exacerbate Chinese threat perceptions, particularly if framed as an extension of NATO’s military role. At the same time, its focus on functional cooperation, especially in areas such as maritime governance and crisis management, offers potential avenues for managing competition short of conflict.
NATO-IP4 cooperation: scope and limits
Maritime security is emerging as a central pillar of NATO-IP4 cooperation. The maritime domain links the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres, encompassing critical sea lines of communication, contested spaces such as the South China Sea, and emerging areas of competition such as the Arctic. For European actors, it offers a flexible entry point: freedom of navigation-style naval deployments, participation in regional exercises such as the US-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) and cooperation on maritime domain awareness and rules-based maritime security initiatives. For NATO as an institution, maritime cooperation provides a relatively low-risk way to engage in Indo-Pacific affairs. Yet it also highlights the limits of current cooperation: European contributions remain episodic, and coordination with Indo-Pacific partners is still developing.
The evolution of the NATO-IP4 partnership therefore reinforces two broader trends. The first is the growing interdependence of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security; the second, the fragmentation of the alliance system into overlapping, functionally driven partnerships rather than a single hierarchical structure. Together, they raise fundamental questions about coherence and effectiveness.
NATO’s engagement with its Indo-Pacific partners reflects both ambition and restraint. As US strategy increasingly prioritises the Indo-Pacific while delegating greater responsibility to allies, NATO-IP4 cooperation is likely to deepen selectively — focusing on functional areas such as technology, maritime security, and resilience — rather than evolving into a fully institutionalised global alliance framework. At the same time, European hedging and Chinese threat perception will continue to constrain deeper integration. This may ultimately be a strength rather than a weakness: in an era of great power competition and institutional uncertainty, adaptability may prove more valuable than formalisation.
LA OTAN Y EL 1P4: ENTRE LA AMBICIÓN Y LA MODERACIÓN
Mientras la OTAN se prepara para su próxima cumbre, los debates sobre el alcance de las alianzas globales —en particular con el Grupo Indo-Pacífico (IP4), integrado por Australia, Japón, Nueva Zelanda y Corea del Sur— han cobrado renovada urgencia. La ausencia de los líderes del IP4 en la Cumbre de la OTAN de 2025 en La Haya, junto con los informes sobre la reticencia de Estados Unidos a formalizar el papel del IP4 en la Cumbre de Ankara, pone de manifiesto un patrón emergente de compromiso selectivo.
El compromiso de la OTAN con el IP4 ha pasado de un diálogo tentativo a una operacionalización cautelosa. Sin embargo, la trayectoria de esta alianza no es lineal ni está garantizada. Está marcada por dos dinámicas que se entrecruzan. Una es la reducción gradual y la redefinición de las prioridades de los compromisos estratégicos de Estados Unidos. La otra es el surgimiento de enfoques europeos más conservadores hacia China y el Indo-Pacífico. En conjunto, estas tendencias están transformando la relación OTAN-IP4, pasando de ser un símbolo de la globalización de la alianza a una forma de cooperación minilateral más selectiva y funcional. Esta dinámica de tira y afloja entre la presión estadounidense por una mayor distribución de la carga y la reticencia europea a intensificar las tensiones con China constituye el eje central de la cooperación OTAN-IP4.
De la curiosidad estratégica a la cooperación funcional: el auge del minilateralismo
El compromiso inicial de la OTAN con sus socios del Indo-Pacífico fue en gran medida político. A principios de la década de 2010, la cooperación se centraba en valores compartidos, consultas y gestión de crisis, a menudo enmarcada en la gobernanza de la seguridad global. El deterioro de las relaciones con Rusia tras 2014 y, de forma más decisiva, el entorno estratégico posterior a 2022 han modificado este enfoque.
El creciente perfil estratégico de China ha sido fundamental para este cambio. La identificación de China por parte de la OTAN como un «desafío sistémico» ha catalizado una reevaluación de las fronteras geográficas y las prioridades operacionales. Al mismo tiempo, los socios del Indo-Pacífico consideran cada vez más a la OTAN como un actor relevante, no solo en el ámbito internacional.
VOX POPULI: WHAT DOES THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE MEAN FOR JAPAN’S IMPERIAL FUTURE?
Princess Aiko, the daughter of Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako, Princess Kako, the second daughter of Crown Prince Fumihito, and Prince Hisahito, the crown prince’s son, wave to well-wishers during the New Year’s public greeting at the Imperial Palace in Tokyo on Jan. 2.
My junior high social studies teacher opened our very first class with a startling declaration: “Let’s memorize the Constitution.”
The classroom erupted in protest. Impossible, we groaned.
And yet the young brain is a curious instrument. After reciting the preamble aloud again and again, its cadences settled somewhere deep inside me. Before long, I could more or less summon it from memory.
The articles that followed were another matter entirely. Their substance was dense, their logic hard to follow, and no amount of repetition could lodge them securely in my adolescent mind.
Article 1, for example, describes the emperor as “the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people.” But why a symbol, and a symbol of what exactly?
And what were we to make of the phrase “deriving his position from the will of the people”?
Even with the teacher’s earnest explanations, we junior high students could not quite grasp what it meant.
Decades later, that question has returned in a different form, amid the current debate over how to secure a sustainable number of imperial family members.
The speaker and vice speaker of the Lower House, together with the president and vice president of the Upper House, have drawn up a document billed as the “consensus of the legislative branch” and handed it to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.
Among the ideas reportedly included is the adoption into the current imperial household of male-line males from former branches of the imperial family.
On the basis of this consensus, the government now intends to pursue a revision of the Imperial House Law during the current Diet session.
The finer points have been deferred. The specifics remain opaque. The ball has been sent, neatly and deliberately, into the government’s court.
Yet, for many citizens, the deeper question lies elsewhere: whether Japan will continue to insist on imperial succession solely by male-line males, or whether it will open the door to female emperors and emperors of female lineage.
In the Japanese succession debate, “male line” means descent from the imperial family through the father, while “female line” means descent through the mother.
These fundamental questions, however, are left untouched in the document. They are sidestepped with notable care, while the adoption proposal is allowed to advance quietly in their place.
One wonders whether this can truly be said to reflect the collective will of the people.
The aging brain, too, is a curious thing. I forget what I ate yesterday, yet the preamble I memorized half a century ago still rises unbidden to my lips.
As for what “the will of the people” means, now more than ever, I find myself unsure.
VOX POPULI: ¿QUÉ SIGNIFICA LA VOLUNTAD DEL PUEBLO PARA EL FUTURO IMPERIAL DE JAPÓN?
La princesa Aiko, hija del emperador Naruhito y la emperatriz Masako; la princesa Kako, segunda hija del príncipe heredero Fumihito; y el príncipe Hisahito, hijo del príncipe heredero, saludan a los asistentes durante el saludo público de Año Nuevo en el Palacio Imperial de Tokio el 2 de enero.
Mi profesor de estudios sociales de secundaria comenzó nuestra primera clase con una declaración sorprendente: «¡Vamos a memorizar la Constitución!».
El aula estalló en protestas. «Imposible», gemimos.
Y, sin embargo, el cerebro joven es un instrumento curioso. Después de recitar el preámbulo en voz alta una y otra vez, sus ritmos se asentaron en lo más profundo de mi ser. En poco tiempo, podía evocarlo de memoria.Los artículos que siguieron fueron otra historia. Su contenido era denso, su lógica difícil de seguir, y ninguna cantidad de repetición lograba fijarlos firmemente en mi mente adolescente. El artículo 1, por ejemplo, describe al emperador como «símbolo del Estado y de la unidad del pueblo».
Pero ¿por qué un símbolo, y símbolo de qué exactamente?
¿Y qué debíamos entender de la frase «que deriva su posición de la voluntad del pueblo»?
A pesar de las sinceras explicaciones del profesor, los alumnos de secundaria no lográbamos comprender del todo su significado.
Fuente: https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16650539
CHINA DEFIES U.S. RESTRICTIONS AND BUILDS THE WORLD’S FASTEST SUPERCOMPUTER
The Chinese supercomputer LineShine was ranked the fastest on the planet, despite not using any GPUs.
China now possesses the world’s fastest supercomputer, having surpassed the United States in this arena. The system, named LineShine and installed at the National Supercomputing Center in Shenzhen, managed to unseat the U.S. machine “El Capitan” from the top spot on the TOP500 list in terms of computing power. This breakthrough comes amidst intense competition between Beijing and Washington for technological supremacy—a rivalry marked by high tariffs and restrictions on a wide range of components and software.
Since 1993, the TOP500 list has identified the planet’s most powerful supercomputers twice a year through a series of standardized tests. These tests evaluate each system’s performance by considering theoretical speed, real-world performance, and energy efficiency.
Historically, the rankings have been dominated by U.S.-developed systems. However, LineShine has returned China to the top spot after an absence of nearly a decade. Experts highlight that this achievement comes at a pivotal moment, given the fierce rivalry between the country and the United States for global technological leadership.
CHINA DESAFÍA LAS RESTRICCIONES DE EE.UU. Y CONSTRUYE LA SUPERCOMPUTADORA MÁS RÁPIDA DEL MUNDO
La supercomputadora china LineShine fue calificada como la más rápida del planeta, pese a no utilizar ninguna GPU.
China posee la supercomputadora más rápida del mundo y ha superado a Estados Unidos en este terreno. El sistema, denominado LineShine e instalado en el Centro Nacional de Supercomputación de Shenzhen, logró desbancar del primer lugar de la clasificación TOP500 al equipo estadounidense El Capitan en términos de potencia de cálculo. El avance se produce en medio de una intensa competencia entre Beijing y Washington por la supremacía tecnológica, marcada por elevados aranceles y restricciones sobre una amplia gama de componentes y programas informáticos.
Desde 1993, el índice TOP500 identifica semestralmente a las supercomputadoras más potentes del planeta mediante una serie de pruebas estandarizadas que evalúan el desempeño de cada sistema, tomando en cuenta tanto su velocidad teórica como su rendimiento real, además de su eficiencia energética.
Históricamente, el ranking ha estado dominado por desarrollos estadounidenses. Sin embargo, LineShine ha devuelto a China a la cima tras casi una década de ausencia. Los especialistas destacan que este logro ocurre en un momento clave debido a la fuerte rivalidad que el país mantiene con Estados Unidos por el liderazgo tecnológico global.
El Capitan, ubicada en Livermore, California, ocupó la primera posición desde 2024. Ahora, los resultados de las pruebas de rendimiento confirmaron que LineShine supera en más de un 20% la capacidad de procesamiento del sistema estadounidense.
Con un consumo eléctrico cercano a los 42.2 megavatios, la supercomputadora china alcanza los 2,198 exaflops, lo que significa que puede ejecutar más de 2 trillones (quintillion, en la escala anglosajona) de operaciones por segundo.
Uno de los aspectos más llamativos de LineShine es que, a diferencia de la mayoría de las supercomputadoras de última generación, no emplea unidades de procesamiento gráfico (GPU). Su funcionamiento se sustenta exclusivamente en unidades centrales de procesamiento (CPU), componentes ampliamente utilizados en teléfonos inteligentes, computadoras personales y laptops, pero poco habituales en sistemas de computación científica de gran escala.
Otro elemento destacable es que toda su infraestructura está compuesta por hardware y software desarrollados en China. La arquitectura de LineShine se basa en la plataforma LingKun y está integrada por cerca de 45,000 procesadores LX2. Cada uno cuenta con 304 núcleos de procesamiento y opera a una frecuencia de 1.55 GHz.
Los nodos se conectan mediante una red de alta velocidad denominada LingQi, diseñada para reducir al mínimo la latencia y agilizar el intercambio de información. En conjunto, el sistema funciona con Kylin OS, un sistema operativo basado en Linux y utilizado con frecuencia en infraestructuras científicas y gubernamentales del país asiático.
Un mensaje claro de China para EE. UU.
El regreso de China a la cima de la clasificación TOP500 ha sido interpretado como un logro que va más allá de poseer la supercomputadora más veloz del planeta. Como sostiene Jimmy Goodrich, investigador principal del Instituto para el Conflicto y la Cooperación Global de la Universidad de California, con este avance “China espera convencer al mundo de que los controles a las exportaciones son inútiles”.
Durante la primera administración de Donald Trump y a lo largo del mandato de Joe Biden, Estados Unidos impuso estrictos controles de exportación sobre componentes, software y plataformas vinculados con la computación avanzada, con el objetivo de frenar el progreso tecnológico chino. En respuesta, Beijing adoptó medidas similares.
Estas restricciones se han intensificado durante la actual gestión de Trump, especialmente por aranceles y limitaciones a la importación de GPU, chips avanzados y otros componentes relacionados con la inteligencia artificial (IA), tecnología que hoy constituye la base de una parte significativa de las supercomputadoras más potentes del mundo.
Jack Dongarra, miembro del Instituto de Estudios Avanzados de la Universidad Texas A&M y uno de los coautores del TOP500, explica que estas restricciones han obligado a China a invertir en el desarrollo de nuevas arquitecturas y tecnologías para construir supercomputadoras capaces de competir con los sistemas de mayor rendimiento de Estados Unidos, pese a no contar con acceso a determinados recursos de última generación.
Published twice per week by Nuevo Poder. Articles and op-eds focusing on geopolitical issues around Indo-Pacific area
Editor: LW, senior fellow of REDCAEM and CESCOS
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