Japanese Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako visit the Brussels City Hall during a state visit to Brussels, Belgium. During their two-week tour of the Netherlands and Belgium al the end June, Japan’s Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako have met the heirs-apparent to the two European thrones.
Both are women. Dutch Crown Princess Catharina-Amalia, 22, and Belgian Crown Princess Elisabeth, 24, are both poised to succeed their fathers, the result of decades-old reforms allowing the eldest child to inherit the throne regardless of gender.
Back home, however, a starkly different reality awaits their 24-year-old only daughter, Princess Aiko. The highly popular princess, who regularly draws big crowds and loud cheers during her public engagements and who is reportedly scheduled to visit Singapore later in 2026, is legally barred from ever ascending the Chrysanthemum Throne.
Nor will an upcoming revision to the 1947 Imperial House Law open a path for her.
The plan, set to be approved by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Cabinet on June 26 and passed before Parliament adjourns on July 17, completely bypasses the issue in seeking a fragile political consensus to ensure the monarchy’s numbers do not shrink further, such is the family’s vital role in fostering international goodwill and domestic unity.
“The historical fact that the imperial line has been passed down through the male line for 126 generations is unparalleled in the world and is the source of the Emperor’s authority and legitimacy,” Takaichi said at the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) convention on April 12.
Yet the debate has become so politically charged that Naruhito, 66, broke from the apolitical nature of his role to implicitly weigh in: “The fundamental nature and activities of the imperial family lie in constantly wishing for people’s happiness and sharing in their joys and sorrows. I hope that discussions on how to secure the number of imperial family members will gain the understanding of the people.”
Japan boasts the world’s oldest continuous hereditary monarchy, tracing mythical origins back to 660BC. Historically, the patrilineal line was sustained through concubinage and polygamy, practices that were once socially acceptable but legally abolished during the Meiji period (1868-1912).
The imperial family shrank further after World War II, when 51 distant relatives from 11 collateral branches were stripped of their royal status, primarily as a cost-cutting measure.
Today, the family has dwindled to just 16 members, with five unmarried princesses and only three eligible male heirs: the Emperor’s younger brother Crown Prince Akishino, 60; his nephew Prince Hisahito, who turns 20 in September; and his uncle Prince Hitachi, 90.
The current proposal has two key prongs. First, royals will be able to retain their status after marriage. Currently, female royals are stripped of their status upon marrying commoners. Under the new law, they will have the choice to retain their royal titles and continue their official duties after marriage.
Second, unmarried male descendants from the 11 ejected branches, aged 15 and above, can choose to be adopted into the imperial family.
Yet this political compromise leaves glaring questions unanswered. It creates a messy legal paradox for families as it leaves undetermined whether the princesses’ spouses and children are to be regarded as royals. Conservatives fear that doing so will pave the way for a matrilineal line, while critics argue that forcing a single household to split into royal and non-royal statuses is socially untenable.
It also remains highly questionable whether the 10 or so prospective male adoptees, who were born and raised as ordinary citizens and reportedly work in industries like advertising and manufacturing, would even want to trade their freedoms for a cloistered, regimented palace life.
Under the proposed law, they would be barred from ever leaving the imperial family after adoption. While they themselves cannot ascend the throne, the law leaves a murky question mark over whether their future children could.
Hideya Kawanishi, an imperial historian at Nagoya University, told The Straits Times that the move is unprecedented and exposes the deep-rooted patriarchal thinking that is pervasive even under Japan’s first female prime minister.
“For potential adoptees, given the intense public scrutiny, the prospect of joining the imperial family is daunting. It seems unlikely anyone will easily step forward,” he said. “My concern is that someone might end up being forced into the role against their will.”
The government defends its male-only stance by arguing that while eight women have occupied the Chrysanthemum Throne – six during the Asuka and Nara periods (592-794) and two during the Edo period (1603-1868) – they served as brief interim placeholders. All belonged to the patrilineal line, and none passed the throne to their own children.
The new proposal not only shelves the prospect of a matrilineal emperor, but also bars Princess Aiko from ever taking the throne.
This is a sharp pivot from 2005, when a four-decade drought of male births in the imperial family brought the LDP to the brink of legalising female or matrilineal succession. But the momentum evaporated overnight when Hisahito was born a year later.
Public sentiment is starkly divided particularly on the adoption plan, polls on June 20-21 found.
While a sweeping majority backs letting princesses keep their status after marriage, the Mainichi newspaper found 28 per cent in favour and 32 per cent against the adoption plan, while the Asahi newspaper found 45 per cent in favour and 36 per cent against.
Kawanishi sees Takaichi’s government as again kicking the can down the road, fearing that the rigid insistence on an exclusively male line could ironically drive the ancient institution to extinction.
“The imperial family has always evolved alongside society, and this evolution is, in itself, its tradition. It has evolved to embrace monogamy and romantic marriages,” he said. “Therefore, I believe Japan should also adapt to the realities of modern society regarding the possibility of a female Emperor. This will preserve the Emperor’s status as a figure who inspires the people’s admiration and, only then, can the institution’s sanctity be upheld.”
LA SUCESIÓN FEMENINA QUEDA DESCARTADA MIENTRAS JAPÓN PLANIFICA UNA REFORMA DE LA LEY IMPERIAL
El emperador de Japón, Naruhito y la emperatriz Masako visitan el Ayuntamiento de Bruselas durante una visita de Estado a la capital belga. Durante su gira de dos semanas por los Países Bajos y Bélgic a fines de junio, el emperador Naruhito y la emperatriz Masako se han reunido con las herederas de ambos tronos europeos.
Ambas son mujeres. Tanto la princesa heredera de los Países Bajos, Catharina-Amalia (22 años), como la princesa heredera de Bélgica, Elisabeth (24 años), están llamadas a suceder a sus padres, gracias a reformas adoptadas hace décadas que permiten al hijo mayor heredar el trono independientemente de su género.
Sin embargo, en su país natal, a su única hija, la princesa Aiko (24 años), le espera una realidad muy distinta. La princesa, que goza de gran popularidad —atrayendo habitualmente a multitudes y vítores en sus actos públicos y con una visita prevista a Singapur para finales de 2026—, tiene legalmente prohibido ascender jamás al Trono del Crisantemo.
Tampoco la próxima revisión de la Ley de la Casa Imperial de 1947 abrirá una vía para ella.
El plan, cuya aprobación por parte del gabinete de la primera ministra Sanae Takaichi está prevista para el 26 de junio —y que deberá ratificarse antes de la clausura de las sesiones parlamentarias el 17 de julio—, elude por completo esta cuestión en su búsqueda de un frágil consenso político. El objetivo es evitar que el número de miembros de la familia imperial se reduzca aún más, dada la importancia vital de la familia para fomentar la buena voluntad internacional y la unidad nacional.
«El hecho histórico de que la línea imperial se haya transmitido por vía masculina durante 126 generaciones no tiene parangón en el mundo y constituye la fuente de la autoridad y legitimidad del emperador», declaró Takaichi el 12 de abril durante la convención del gobernante Partido Liberal Democrático (PLD).
CHINA SHOWS OFF A TRUCK-MOUNTED ELECTROMAGNETIC CATAPULT FOR LAUNCHING LARGE DRONES
The modular system is shown launching a drone in a video and is part of a family of containerized weapons and sensors first revealed by China late last year.
China has demonstrated a modular, truck-mounted electromagnetic catapult in operation for the first time. The system appears in a video launching a propeller-driven drone from a mobile ground platform made up of three aligned trucks. This provides visual proof that the concept has moved beyond the mock-ups or renderings seen previously and has advanced to actual launch trials.
The video, circulated on social media, begins by showing the drone taking off from the catapult. The aircraft features a high-wing configuration, a V-tail, and tricycle landing gear. It does not appear to be one of the stealthy CCA (Collaborative Combat Aircraft) drones displayed alongside the system during its public debut late last year, but rather a smaller, lighter craft. Nevertheless, the focus of interest is the launch platform itself, rather than the specific drone used in the test.
Following the launch, the footage shows the three trucks driving in a convoy before linking up to form a single launch track. Overhead covers are also visible; their most likely function is to protect the system during transport and perhaps partially conceal its purpose, although the vehicle shapes and front connection points remain quite recognizable.
CHINA MUESTRA CATAPULTA ELECTROMAGNÉTICA FORMADA POR TRES CAMIONES PARA EL LANZAMIENTO DE DRONES DE GRAN TAMAÑO
El sistema modular aparece en un vídeo lanzando un dron y forma parte de una familia de armas y sensores en contenedores mostrada por primera vez por China a finales del año pasado
China ha mostrado por primera vez en funcionamiento una catapulta electromagnética modular montada sobre camiones. El sistema aparece en un vídeo lanzando un dron de hélice desde una plataforma terrestre móvil formada por tres camiones alineados. Es la primera prueba visual de que el concepto no se limita a maquetas o renders, como se había visto hasta ahora, sino que ya ha pasado a ensayos reales de lanzamiento.
El vídeo difundido en redes sociales muestra primero el despegue del dron desde la catapulta. La aeronave tiene configuración de ala alta, cola en V y tren de aterrizaje triciclo. No parece uno de los drones furtivos de tipo CCA, siglas en inglés de Aeronave de combate colaborativa, que se habían mostrado junto al sistema cuando apareció públicamente a finales del año pasado, sino un aparato más pequeño y ligero. Aun así, el interés está en la plataforma de lanzamiento, no tanto en el dron concreto utilizado en la prueba.
Tras el lanzamiento, las imágenes enseñan los tres camiones circulando separados en convoy y uniéndose para formar una única pista de lanzamiento. También se aprecian unas cubiertas superiores cuya función más probable es proteger el sistema durante el transporte y quizá disimular parcialmente su propósito, aunque la forma de los vehículos y los puntos de conexión delanteros siguen siendo bastante reconocibles.
La parte más llamativa del vídeo es la maniobrabilidad del conjunto. Los camiones cuentan con dirección en todas las ruedas y pueden girar prácticamente sobre sí mismos, incluso cuando están unidos. Esto es relevante porque una catapulta de este tipo debe poder orientarse contra el viento antes del lanzamiento. En un sistema terrestre móvil, y más aún si se usa en espacios reducidos, esa capacidad de giro es casi tan importante como la propia catapulta.
EMALS, siglas de Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, es el nombre técnico de las catapultas electromagnéticas. A diferencia de una catapulta de vapor, emplea energía electromagnética para acelerar la aeronave a lo largo de una pista. La ventaja es que permite modular mejor la fuerza aplicada al avión o al dron, algo útil cuando se lanzan aparatos de distintos tamaños y pesos. También puede reducir los tiempos entre lanzamientos frente a sistemas más antiguos, aunque en este caso no se conoce todavía el ritmo real de operación.
El vídeo se está moviendo acompañado de un gráfico que muestra una familia completa de sistemas en contenedores. No se trata solo de la catapulta. En la imagen aparecen contenedores con lanzadores de misiles de crucero de ataque terrestre y antibuque, misiles tierra-aire, radares, equipos de guerra electrónica, sistemas de mando y control, un sistema de defensa cercana Type 1130 de 30 mm y lanzadores defensivos Type 726. También se ve un contenedor con un camión de catapulta EMALS y otro con un dron desmontado muy parecido al que aparece en el lanzamiento.
Antes de la difusión de este vídeo, ya se había podido ver el Zhong Da 79, un carguero chino que a finales del año pasado apareció con varios de estos sistemas en contenedores sobre su cubierta. Entonces no estaba claro cuánto había de desarrollo real y cuánto de demostración conceptual, informan desde The War Zone. Algunas de las piezas vistas a bordo parecían maquetas, pero las nuevas imágenes cambian parcialmente esa lectura al mostrar al menos la catapulta móvil realizando un lanzamiento real.
Más allá de lo que se ve en el vídeo, los detalles son escasos. No se sabe dónde ni cuándo se grabó la prueba. Tampoco se conoce cómo se cargan los drones sobre la catapulta, un punto decisivo para saber cuántos lanzamientos podría realizar en poco tiempo. Una posibilidad es que otros camiones transporten los drones y se acoplen por detrás al sistema, pero no hay confirmación.
También se desconoce la demanda energética de la catapulta y qué apoyo logístico necesita para funcionar en tierra o sobre la cubierta de un buque. Que sea móvil no significa que sea autónoma en todos los sentidos. Otro punto abierto es su uso naval. El hecho de que pueda colocarse sobre un barco no garantiza que pueda lanzar drones con seguridad si la cubierta se mueve por el oleaje. La estabilidad del conjunto, la longitud necesaria de la pista y el peso máximo de los drones que puede lanzar siguen sin estar claros.
Lo que sí muestra el vídeo es un concepto muy específico consistente en una pista de lanzamiento desmontable, transportable por carretera y potencialmente embarcable. No sustituye a un portaaviones ni pretende lanzar cazas convencionales, pero sí apunta a una forma distinta de operar drones de cierto tamaño sin depender de una pista fija.
CAN INDIA AND CHINA FINALLY RESOLVE THEIR HIMALAYAN BORDER DISPUTE?
- The primary disputed areas are Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh (Zangnan), along their 3,488km border. The 1962 conflict established the Line of Actual Control.
- Territories hold strategic value for both nations, like China’s G219 highway. Achieving an “early harvest” deal for border delimitation faces the challenge of deeply differing views.
China and India are taking steps to get relations back on track after deadly clashes along their disputed Himalayan frontier in 2020, with the two sides in May discussing how to settle their territorial disagreements.
During a visit to New Delhi, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and articulated Beijing’s longstanding position that the boundary disputes should not hold their wider relationship hostage. India says it wants peace and stability on the border in order to progress bilateral ties.
The stage is now set for more specific border negotiations in coming weeks between Wang and Doval in Beijing.
Which regions are disputed?
India and China dispute the ownership of several areas, but the main focus of the rift centres on two stretches of territory along their roughly 3,488km shared frontier. Both are mountainous and sparsely populated.
The disputed area to the west is known as Aksai Chin, a high-altitude plateau of approximately 38,000 sq km. China, which administers the territory, claims it as part of its Xinjiang and Tibet regions. India considers it part of its federally administered northern territory of Ladakh.
Further east, both nations also claim about 84,000 sq km of territory under India’s control. Most of it encompasses what India considers to be its northern state of Arunachal Pradesh. China says the land is part of Tibet and refers to it as Zangnan, or South Tibet.
What is the history of the dispute?
After India achieved independence from British colonial rule in 1947, there were a number of unsuccessful attempts to agree on the boundary.
In the late 1950s, India discovered that China had built a strategic road linking Xinjiang and Tibet through Aksai Chin. Beginning in 1956, the two sides entered into negotiations to settle the dispute, with China’s then-Premier Zhou Enlai offering at one point to withdraw to the colonial-era border in the east, known as the McMahon Line, if India would accept Chinese control over Aksai Chin in the west.
Zhou made the offer even though China had never formally accepted the legality of the McMahon Line because it was agreed with the government in Tibet, whose boundary-drawing authority Beijing did not recognise. Nonetheless, Jawaharlal Nehru, then India’s prime minister, rejected the proposal, saying the boundary was already established and India was not open to bargaining.
Tensions steadily grew, culminating in the 1962 conflict in which China attacked and overran Indian positions on both disputed frontiers. The war resulted in a de facto border known as the Line of Actual Control that still exists in the absence of a formal settlement. On-and-off clashes have continued to this day.
In 2005, the nations signed a treaty that established a framework for a potential future boundary settlement. Under this agreement, they committed to resolve the dispute through “peaceful and friendly consultations”; to refrain from using or threatening force; and to make meaningful adjustments to their respective positions in order to arrive at a “package settlement”.
In 2019, the Indian government moved to take greater control over Ladakh and Beijing accused it of seeking to undermine China’s sovereignty. The following year, China surprised India by deploying troops in the part of the disputed region that it controls. The stand-off ended four years later, when the two countries pulled its forces back from some areas. But the tensions it created have endured.
Why are the territories important to each country?
Both sides say their claims are justified by historical precedent. India maintains that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of the country and that Aksai Chin was part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, one of the territories overseen by Indian hereditary rulers under the British.
China maintains that its border with India was never truly agreed upon. From China’s point of view, Zangnan has long been part of Tibet. It regards Aksai Chin as historically administered from Tibet and Xinjiang and also claims two other areas along the frontier.
Some of the contested territories have strategic significance. China’s G219 highway linking Xinjiang and Tibet cuts through eastern Aksai Chin. The wider border region also houses critical transboundary rivers that support agriculture in both countries.
What triggered the latest negotiations?
The instability on the border is one reason why India for decades sought good ties with Russia and with Western powers led by the US. But New Delhi is now trying to navigate an increasingly volatile relationship with the US, which under President Donald Trump has prioritised power politics and tried to strong-arm even friendly countries, making the international order more unstable.
A better working relationship between India and China would facilitate collaboration between the two when it is in their mutual interest. It would help avoid the sporadic diplomatic crises that have hampered efforts to boost trade between the Asian economic superpowers. And it would reduce security concerns for India, which also has a tense relationship with another neighbor, Pakistan, following a four-day conflict in 2025.
China describes the boundary question as a historical legacy that should not be allowed to define the overall relationship. Its leaders have repeatedly said the issue should be placed in an “appropriate position” in bilateral ties. By contrast, India has argued that peace and tranquility along the border are essential for normal bilateral ties.
China may see an interest in settling the dispute as a way to help it focus on other, more pressing priorities: strategic competition with the US, tensions with other neighbors in the South China Sea, its territorial claim over Taiwan, and a slowing domestic economy.
How would an agreement be achieved?
As is typical of border negotiations, any final settlement of the India-China boundary would involve three steps: delimitation, agreeing where the border should run; delineation, drawing that agreed border on official maps; and demarcation, physically marking it on the ground with pillars, markers or other reference points.
In 2025, the two sides agreed to establish an expert group to explore an“early harvest” deal. That is a term for an agreement that delivers limited, achievable results rather than waiting for a comprehensive, final settlement.
The significance of that agreement was that it moved the two sides beyond managing the conflict over the border and explicitly introduced work on boundary delimitation. Yet the central challenge remains: India and China still do not share a common view of where the border lies.
¿PODRÁN INDIA Y CHINA RESOLVER FINALMENTE SU DISPUTA FROTERIZA EN EL HIMALAYA
China e India buscan activamente recomponer sus relaciones tras los enfrentamientos fronterizos mortales de 2020. Se prevén futuras negociaciones fronterizas entre Wang Yi y Ajit Doval.
• Las principales zonas en disputa son Aksai Chin y Arunachal Pradesh (Zangnan), a lo largo de su frontera de 3.488 km. El conflicto de 1962 estableció la Línea de Control Actual.
• Los territorios poseen un valor estratégico para ambas naciones; un ejemplo de ello es la carretera china G219. Lograr un acuerdo de “cosecha temprana” para la delimitación fronteriza se enfrenta al desafío de posturas profundamente divergentes.
China e India están tomando medidas para encauzar nuevamente sus relaciones tras los enfrentamientos mortales ocurridos en 2020 a lo largo de su disputada frontera en el Himalaya; ambas partes debatieron en mayo cómo resolver sus desacuerdos territoriales.
Durante una visita a Nueva Delhi, el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores chino, Wang Yi, se reunió con el asesor de Seguridad Nacional de la India, Ajit Doval, y expuso la postura histórica de Pekín de que las disputas fronterizas no deben condicionar el conjunto de su relación bilateral. Por su parte, India afirma buscar paz y estabilidad en la frontera para avanzar en los vínculos bilaterales.
Todo está listo para que, en las próximas semanas, Wang y Doval celebren negociaciones fronterizas más concretas en Pekín.
Published twice per week by Nuevo Poder. Articles and op-eds focusing on geopolitical issues around Indo-Pacific area
Editor: LW, senior fellow of REDCAEM and CESCOS
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