The governments of the United States and China both assert that theirs is the most important bilateral relationship in the world. They also agree that the likeliest trigger for an armed conflict between them is Taiwan. In theory, then, it should come as a relief that U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping discussed Taiwan at length in Beijing last month and that the leaders emerged with a better understanding of each other’s positions.
Yet the U.S.-Chinese summit was anything but reassuring. Rather, it represented Xi’s opening move in what will be a sustained effort to get the Trump administration to distance itself from Taiwan. Trump’s visit had barely begun when China released a statement that shared a warning Xi had imparted to Trump: if Taiwan “is handled properly, the bilateral relationship will enjoy overall stability,” but if it is not, “the two countries will have clashes and even conflicts, putting the entire relationship in great jeopardy.”
Xi intends to change what it means for Taiwan to be “handled properly” by the United States. Like his predecessors, Xi believes preventing Taiwan’s permanent separation is a core national interest and views its continued autonomy as evidence that China’s civil war remains unfinished. Unlike his predecessors, however, Xi appears to consider it essential to his legacy that he make tangible progress toward bringing Taiwan under China’s authority. At the beginning of his tenure, in 2013, Xi noted that the Taiwan question cannot continue to be passed on from generation to generation. He has since asserted that gaining control of Taiwan is central to China’s rejuvenation, a task that must be fulfilled by 2049, a century after the founding of the People’s Republic of China.
Although Xi has instructed his military to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027, his preference is to gain control of the island without firing a shot. Going to war, even against a weaker foe, is always hazardous, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the United States’ military campaign against Iran make clear. If Xi invaded Taiwan and ended up in a protracted conflict, he would risk his power and legitimacy. And Xi knows that using force against Taiwan would come at the expense of economic development because the United States and its allies would, at the very minimum, respond by cutting China off from advanced technology and imposing crippling economic and financial sanctions.
Xi seems to have concluded that the surest path to securing control of Taiwan without a war runs through Trump, who has frequently criticized Taiwan and questioned the wisdom of defending the island. Xi’s influence was apparent in the days after the May summit, as Trump borrowed rhetoric from Beijing in statements about Taiwanese domestic politics and paused a pending arms sale to Taipei. Trump then repeated his claim that Taiwan stole the U.S. chip industry and said he did not want the United States to fight a war over Taiwan 9,500 miles away. His administration got the message. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth subsequently failed to mention Taiwan in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the first time a U.S. defense secretary omitted Taiwan from such a speech in a decade.
What is motivating Trump’s comments and his dismissal of decades of U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is unclear. It might be a belief that this is the best path to de-escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait and avoiding an armed conflict. It could also reflect a conclusion that reducing support for Taiwan is a price worth paying for improved commercial access to China or a broader détente with Beijing.
The objective of China’s leader is far clearer. Xi is seeking to redefine what is considered normal in the United States’ approach to Taiwan. If China can bring about changes in U.S. policy that strengthen doubts regarding Washington’s reliability, doubts that have already gained ground because of the Trump administration’s general skepticism toward allies, many in Taiwan may conclude that they have no choice but to seek an accommodation on Beijing’s terms. Such a development would raise alarm throughout the region. U.S. allies would come to question the wisdom of putting their security in Washington’s hands, leading to a decisive shift in the balance of power in Beijing’s favor. American policymakers should recognize China’s strategy for what it is and stop giving ground on U.S. commitments to Taiwan—because for now, Xi is moving closer to the success he wants.
A NEW NORMAL
At the May summit in Beijing, Xi appeared to put two steps of his plan in motion. The first was to convince Trump that Taiwan is pursuing formal independence and that unless Washington reins in Taipei, such a move risks triggering a cycle of escalation that could lead to a U.S.-Chinese war. Xi’s words had the desired effect. In an interview with Fox News after the summit, Trump said that Taiwan has “somebody there now that wants to go independent” and that Taiwan’s leaders “want to get into a war and they figure they have the United States behind them.” Such statements are at odds with reality: Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party is not pursuing independence and has responded with restraint to Chinese military provocations.
The next step, and a matter of more immediate concern, was to ensure that Trump did not approve a pending $14 billion arms package to Taiwan. Here, too, Xi made headway. Trump commented in the same interview that he was holding the arms package “in abeyance” and that he considered it a “very good negotiating chip.” Trump told reporters during the flight home from Beijing that he and Xi discussed arms sales “in great detail”—in contravention of a long-standing U.S. policy not to consult China on arms sales to Taiwan. The first Trump administration had reaffirmed that commitment, but now the president dismissed it when asked about it on the plane.
Even if the arms package moves forward in the end, the delay will have paid dividends for Beijing. China is less concerned about the delivery of specific weapons to Taiwan, especially given that the arms under review would not arrive on the island until years after the sale was approved. Rather, the intent behind getting Trump to withhold approval was to set a precedent that Washington would consult with Beijing on future arms sales and to sow doubts about the United States’ reliability, thereby undermining Taiwan’s resolve to defend itself and encouraging pro-Chinese politics on the island.
The U.S.-Chinese summit was anything but reassuring.
And now that Xi sees that Trump is willing to renegotiate decades-old elements of U.S. policy toward Taiwan, he will continue to press for concessions. He might, for instance, urge Trump to explicitly endorse Beijing’s view that Taiwan is a part of China, which would represent a fundamental shift in U.S. policy and undercut Taiwan’s international standing. Xi could press Washington to downgrade its security cooperation with Taiwan and even with Australia and the Philippines, which would further undermine deterrence. He could coax Trump to tell Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to refrain from playing a role in cross-strait matters.
China is attempting to set new norms around how the United States handles Taiwan. By drawing Trump into making statements and taking actions that his predecessors have not, Xi is establishing a new baseline to which he will hold Trump and his successors if they want to have productive relations with Beijing in other areas. China could demand that future U.S. presidents issue similar warnings to Taiwanese leaders about independence and consult Beijing on arms sales as a cost of doing business. If future administrations decline to do so, China could use their refusal as a pretext for increasing its coercion of Taiwan and taking punitive actions against the United States. Call it linkage, Chinese-style.
In the meantime, Beijing is increasing its pressure on Taiwan. A few weeks after Xi’s summit with Trump, China launched what it called a “special maritime law enforcement operation” off Taiwan’s east coast in which its coast guard interfered with commercial shipping. The Chinese coast guard also entered prohibited waters near an island Taiwan controls in the South China Sea. With these two unprecedented actions, Beijing is aiming to assert its jurisdiction over Taiwan’s waters and set the foundation for a future quarantine of the island.
THINGS FALL APART
The concessions Xi is pushing Trump to make are designed to raise doubts about U.S. commitments to Taiwan, which in turn serves China’s goals of drawing Taiwan further into its orbit and weakening the United States’ regional alliance network. Most immediately, the damage to U.S. credibility threatens to undo important progress Taiwan has made in boosting its defenses. Taiwan’s defense budget has doubled in nominal terms over the last decade, now standing at 3.3 percent of GDP, and Taiwan is aiming for five percent of GDP by the end of the decade—the level of spending the Trump administration has demanded that NATO allies reach by 2035. In May, Taiwan’s legislature approved a $25 billion special defense budget to procure critical capabilities from the United States, such as air defense interceptors, surface-to-air missiles, and antitank and antiarmor missiles.
But if Taiwan can no longer trust that the United States will help it bolster its defenses through arms sales and potentially intervene on its behalf, Taiwanese politicians will have a harder time making the case that further spending will do much to help Taiwan deter or fight off a Chinese attack. According to a 2026 survey conducted in Taiwan, only 34 percent of respondents agreed that the United States “is a credible country.” This number had already declined by more than ten percentage points in the last five years, and Trump’s comments and vacillation on the arms sale could make it dip further. As confidence in Washington’s protection erodes, skeptical politicians will grow even more reluctant to fund defense budgets they consider ineffective. The argument for more accommodation of China will in turn gain traction. Beijing hopes to exploit this opening to push the opposition Kuomintang in a more overtly pro-Chinese direction and return a refashioned KMT to power in 2028.
Xi’s preference is to gain control of Taiwan without firing a shot.
The consequences of a reduction in U.S. support for Taiwan will not stop there. U.S. policy toward Taiwan is seen throughout the Indo-Pacific as a critical indicator of the strength of U.S. commitments. If Washington is willing to negotiate away its support for Taipei, other countries in the region will conclude that they can no longer count on the United States to ensure their security. Countries such as Japan and South Korea might embark on larger military buildups, contemplate acquiring nuclear weapons, and pursue a more autonomous foreign policy that does not necessarily align with U.S. interests. Most countries, however, would conclude that they had little choice but to accommodate Beijing’s preferences.
Either way, the alliance network that anchors the U.S. position in Asia and that remains Washington’s central advantage over Beijing would be severely damaged. Chinese influence would increase, potentially enabling Beijing to constrict U.S. trade and investment relationships in the region. The United States, facing a bolder China and without strong alliances to support it, would have to spend even more on defense to ensure its security.
Crucially, a perceived decline in U.S. support for Taiwan would make it harder for other countries to take steps to strengthen deterrence, further destabilizing the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, the United States has made significant progress in making Taiwan’s fate a matter of international concern. Bilateral statements with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, as well as multilateral statements from the G-7, have highlighted the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Washington has encouraged its allies and partners to deepen their cooperation with Taiwan and consider how they would contribute in the event of a conflict. These countries’ willingness to risk Beijing’s wrath depends on the assurance of Washington’s backing. If the United States downgrades its own commitments to Taiwan, they will reassess theirs, too.
REGAINING BALANCE
The United States has good reasons not to let China drive a wedge between Washington and Taipei. From a military perspective, Taiwan occupies a critical position along the first island chain, which stretches from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines. If China were to gain control of Taiwan, it would have a much easier time projecting power in the Pacific Ocean and threatening U.S. territory, and the United States would struggle to defend its treaty allies, above all Japan and the Philippines, from Chinese aggression. China would be able to control the sea-lanes that Japan relies on for energy and food, giving Beijing inordinate leverage over Tokyo. And after Russia’s invasion and attempted conquest of Ukraine, a Chinese attack that resulted in the annexation of Taiwan would further weaken the global norm against changing the status quo by force. More countries would be emboldened to pursue revanchist claims, resulting in a world of even greater chaos.
Allowing Taiwan to fall under Chinese control would also be a devastating blow for liberal democracy. The Taiwanese people have built one of Asia’s strongest democracies despite facing an existential threat from a far more powerful authoritarian neighbor and operating largely in isolation from other countries. Taiwan stands as an example to China’s citizens that a majority ethnic Chinese society can thrive as a democracy. Extinguishing it would have a chilling effect on democratic aspirations not just in the region but around the world.
A conflict over Taiwan would be economically devastating, too. According to Bloomberg, such a war would shave $10 trillion off global output, a shock greater than the COVID-19 pandemic. This is largely because Taiwan produces the vast majority of the world’s most advanced semiconductors, which are needed for everything from smartphones to computers, weapons, and artificial intelligence servers. But chip production is not all that makes Taiwan central to the global economy. The entire AI supply chain runs through Taiwan and is supported by an ecosystem of hundreds of Taiwanese companies. Because of this, Taiwan is now the United States’ fourth-largest trading partner; the United States imports more from Taiwan than it does from China. Although Washington is seeking to reshore semiconductor production, Taiwan will be a crucial economic partner for the foreseeable future. The most advanced chips produced in the United States today still need to be shipped to Taiwan for post-processing. Even if reshoring is wildly successful, the bulk of the world’s most advanced chips will be produced in Taiwan for many years to come.
A worst-case scenario becomes more likely if China succeeds in its attempts to establish new norms for how the United States approaches Taiwan. But Washington can still disrupt Beijing’s strategy and undo the damage from Trump’s comments on Taiwan and his decision to pause arms sales. The first task is to approve the arms package. Xi may respond by canceling his September visit to Washington, but that would be a price well worth paying if he comes away understanding that Taiwan is not his for the taking.
For now, Xi is moving closer to the success he wants.
To ease the doubts about the U.S. commitment to Taiwan that Trump has sown will require more than new arms sales, however. The Trump administration needs to take further action to deter Chinese aggression, such as by helping Taiwan develop its domestic defense industry through joint ventures and technology transfers. Taiwan needs to invest now to ensure that it can quickly scale up production during a crisis, when resupplying the island will be enormously difficult. It needs U.S. help to do so.
Just as important, Washington should send a strong signal that it is committed to Taiwan’s protection and expects its partners to contribute to a U.S.-led defense. President Joe Biden made such a public commitment on four separate occasions, endorsing what we termed “strategic clarity” in Foreign Affairs in 2020. Although senior officials unfortunately walked back the president’s comments, what is notable is that Biden’s statements did not spark a crisis in U.S. relations with China. On the contrary, they might well have discouraged Beijing from testing U.S. will.
Making such a commitment credible today requires that the United States maintain sufficient military power in the region and that its forces are positioned to respond in a Taiwan contingency. It also requires that Washington push back against China’s attempts to assert its jurisdiction over Taiwan, such as by pursuing greater cooperation with Taiwan’s coast guard.
At the same time, the United States should make clear to China that it is not looking for a confrontation. It should reassure Beijing that Washington does not support Taiwan’s independence, that it continues to adhere to its “one China” policy, and that it would support any resolution of cross-strait differences that enjoys the consent of the Taiwanese people.
The United States has deterred Chinese aggression against Taiwan for decades and can continue to do so. The difficulty China’s military faces in launching an amphibious invasion, Taiwan’s defensive advantages, the United States’ upper hand in undersea warfare, and the combined power of allied forces all work in Washington’s favor—as long as the United States is seen as trustworthy by its partners, especially Taiwan and Japan.
But now, Washington must also hold off another line of attack from Beijing. An increasingly powerful, confident, and assertive China is attempting to squeeze Taiwan by persuading Washington to back away from Taipei one step at a time, beginning with delaying or canceling proposed arms sales. It is up to the Trump administration to stop playing into Xi’s hands—and to recognize that the surest way to prevent a conflict in the Taiwan Strait or a costly Chinese takeover of the island is to leave Beijing in no doubt about the United States’ commitment to Taiwan.
Richard Haass and David Sacks
RICHARD HAASS is President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, Senior Counselor at Centerview Partners, and the author of a weekly Substack newsletter, Home & Away.
DAVID SACKS is Fellow for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of the forthcoming book The Realist: Hans Morgenthau and the Purpose of American Power.
CHINA PODRÍA GANAR A TAIWÁN SIN LUCHAR: EL COSTO DE LA AMBIGÜEDAD DE TRUMP
Los gobiernos de Estados Unidos y China afirman que la suya es la relación bilateral más importante del mundo. También coinciden en que Taiwán es el detonante más probable de un conflicto armado entre ellos. En teoría, entonces, debería ser un alivio que el presidente estadounidense Donald Trump y el líder chino Xi Jinping discutieran extensamente sobre Taiwán en Pekín el mes pasado y que ambos líderes salieran con una mejor comprensión de las posiciones del otro.
Sin embargo, la cumbre entre Estados Unidos y China distó mucho de ser tranquilizadora. Más bien, representó el primer paso de Xi en lo que será un esfuerzo sostenido para lograr que la administración Trump se distancie de Taiwán. La visita de Trump apenas había comenzado cuando China emitió un comunicado que compartía una advertencia que Xi le había transmitido: si Taiwán “se maneja adecuadamente, la relación bilateral gozará de estabilidad general”, pero si no, “los dos países tendrán enfrentamientos e incluso conflictos, poniendo en grave peligro toda la relación”.
Xi pretende cambiar el significado de que Estados Unidos “maneje adecuadamente” a Taiwán. Al igual que sus predecesores, Xi cree que evitar la separación permanente de Taiwán es un interés nacional fundamental y considera su continua autonomía como prueba de que la guerra civil china aún no ha terminado. Sin embargo, a diferencia de sus predecesores, Xi parece considerar esencial para su legado lograr avances tangibles para someter a Taiwán a la autoridad de China. Al comienzo de su mandato, en 2013, Xi señaló que la cuestión de Taiwán no puede seguir transmitiéndose de generación en generación. Desde entonces, ha afirmado que tomar el control de Taiwán es fundamental para el resurgimiento de China, una tarea que debe completarse para 2049, un siglo después de la fundación de la República Popular China.
Aunque Xi ha ordenado a sus fuerzas armadas que estén preparadas para tomar Taiwán para 2027, prefiere tomar el control de la isla sin disparar un solo tiro. Ir a la guerra, incluso contra un adversario más débil, siempre es arriesgado, como lo demuestran la invasión rusa de Ucrania y la campaña militar estadounidense contra Irán. Si Xi invadiera Taiwán y terminara en un conflicto prolongado, pondría en riesgo su poder y legitimidad.
Richard Haass y David Sacks
RICHARD HAASS es Presidente Emérito del Consejo de Relaciones Exteriores, Asesor Principal en Centerview Partners y autor del boletín semanal de Substack, Home & Away.
DAVID SACKS es Investigador de Estudios Asiáticos en el Consejo de Relaciones Exteriores y autor del próximo libro The Realist: Hans Morgenthau and the Purpose of American Power.
CHINESE MILITIA USING FISHING BOATS TO FORM “WALLS” AT SEA
Because the militia measures using fishing boats are not technically a show of military force, the moves are categorized as “gray-zone operations” that may not be covered under international law.
The “walls” were formed on at least four occasions since October 2024, sources said.
Two took place before and after Chinese military exercises around Taiwan. The experts say Japan is likely also a potential target of the militia maneuvers.
The Asahi Shimbun confirmed the Chinese vessels’ movements through data from Global Fishing Watch (GFW), a nonprofit organization that identifies maritime positions through signals from the Automatic Identification System (AIS), as well as satellite images.
The first “wall” of Chinese vessels was observed around Oct. 19, 2024, off the eastern coast of China’s Zhejiang province. The line of vessels extended along 123.5 degrees east longitude for more than 100 kilometers southward from a point at 30 degrees north latitude.
According to GFW, about 770 Chinese vessels were involved, and most remained in the same location for roughly 24 hours. The “wall” was created after Chinese military exercises simulated the encirclement of Taiwan, which began five days earlier on Oct. 14.
The largest number of vessels used in a “wall” was observed around Dec. 25, 2025. About 2,000 vessels created a wall consisting of two reversed L-shaped formations spanning about 470 km from north to south. This formation occurred just days before Chinese military exercises started on Dec. 29, during which Taiwan was again encircled.
Around Jan. 11 this year, about 1,400 fishing vessels formed a wall extending roughly 220 km north to south. And the fourth wall, seen around March 2, was created about 100 km farther north in waters closer to Japan’s Kyushu region.
Professor Chisako Masuo of Kyushu University, an expert on China’s maritime affairs, said the formations involved the maritime militia, a quasi-military organization supporting the Chinese armed forces.
“China’s maritime militia is training to line up at sea,” she said. “In disputes with Japan, such as over the Senkaku Islands, or in a possible contingency involving Taiwan, China will likely deploy the maritime militia at first.”
She noted that such gray-zone operations using mobilized fishing vessels fall into a legally ambiguous category under international law, and Japan and Taiwan may be slow to initially respond to such action.
China’s maritime militia existed before the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, according to reports.
Under the system, fishermen and others receive instructions from Chinese military authorities to undertake missions related to national defense and the protection of maritime interests.
Some estimates suggest there are around 200,000 members of the maritime militia.
‘I am a militiaman’
Asahi Shimbun reporters traced the routes of fishing vessels that formed the “wall” on Jan. 11. Many of the vessels had returned to a fishing port in Zhoushan, Zhejiang province. In early February, ahead of the Lunar New Year, the port was filled with fishing boats docked after their trips.
Based on identification numbers painted on the boats, GFW data confirmed that several of the docked vessels were in waters where the “wall” was formed.
When asked about the militia activity, a fisherman sorting nets on deck said his vessel did not take part. “Only the lead vessels in each fleet participate,” he said.
According to GFW data, his vessels and several other boats departed on the morning of Jan. 11. One boat broke away around 8 p.m. and joined the “wall” for about eight hours.
It rejoined the group after the formation dissolved. The other vessels had continued fishing slightly south of the “wall.” A typical fishing group in the East China Sea consists of seven to 10 vessels, with each carrying eight to nine crew members, multiple fishermen said. The captain, usually from Zhejiang province, owns the vessel, while other crew members are migrant workers from inland provinces like Anhui and Guizhou.
“I am a militiaman,” one captain, who leads a fleet, said.
He allowed Asahi Shimbun reporters aboard his boat, which featured a panel displaying the Chinese Communist Party’s membership oath on a wall. He said he was the only militiaman among the crew. “In the event of war, the migrant workers will return to their hometowns, but I must sail if ordered by the military,” he said.
He said he participates in several days of “military training” as instructed each year, typically around August. Participants receive daily compensation of 200 to 300 yuan (about $29 to $44) as well as fuel costs, he said. Although GFW data showed his vessel was near the “wall” on Jan. 11, he said it did not join it.
“There was no notification from the military for this voyage. The vessels involved in this training must belong to a different group,” he said.
Pretext for force
Masahiro Yumino, a former Foreign Ministry analyst specializing in Chinese militias, says China maintains a “national defense mobilization” system that broadly incorporates citizens and resources.
Yumino said local People’s Armed Forces Departments oversee the maritime militia.
The Chinese government reported 8 million militia personnel nationwide in 2011. They have been deployed for public security in urban and rural areas, as well as disaster relief.
Yumino estimates the maritime militia component alone holds 200,000 to 300,000 members. Their missions include deployment to disputed areas while posing as ordinary fishing vessels, coordination with Chinese coast guard ships, and obstruction or intimidation of foreign vessels.
It is believed that maritime militia members are sometimes ordered to collide with other ships. Jason Wang, chief operating officer of the U.S.-based geospatial intelligence firm ingeniSPACE, which identified the post-December 2025 “wall” activities, said the maritime militia conducts intelligence gathering and patrols, serving as the “eyes and ears” of the Chinese military.
The “walls” of thousands of fishing vessels could block commercial shipping and effectively close sea lanes, he said.
“Activities of the Chinese maritime militia target not just Taiwan but also commercial shipping to Japan and South Korea,” Wang said. These forces are trained for maritime interdiction and armed conflict scenarios, and could disrupt routes used by oil, LNG tankers and container ships.
Masuo of Kyushu University also said Japan is likely a primary target of these “wall” formations, as most of the vessels involved have departed from Zhejiang province, which is closer to Japan than Fujian province across from Taiwan.
If tensions escalate over the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture, the maritime militia could surge into Japanese territorial waters or even land on the islands, creating a pretext for Chinese military intervention, Masuo said.
MILICIAS CHINAS UTILIZAN BARCOS DE PESCA PARA FORMAR “MUROS” EN EL MAR
Cientos, e incluso miles, de buques pesqueros chinos han formado repetidamente largas “murallas” en el Mar de China Oriental, que aparentemente son maniobras de entrenamiento de la “milicia marítima” destinadas a reforzar la acción militar real.
Según los expertos, estos “muros” están diseñados para obstruir las rutas marítimas, reafirmar las reivindicaciones territoriales de China e intimidar a los buques de otros países.
Dado que las medidas empleadas por las milicias mediante el uso de barcos pesqueros no constituyen técnicamente una demostración de fuerza militar, estas acciones se clasifican como “operaciones en la zona gris” que podrían no estar contempladas en el derecho internacional.
Según las fuentes, los “muros” se formaron en al menos cuatro ocasiones desde octubre de 2024.
Dos de los incidentes tuvieron lugar antes y después de los ejercicios militares chinos en las cercanías de Taiwán. Los expertos señalan que Japón también podría ser un objetivo potencial de las maniobras de la milicia.
El diario Asahi Shimbun confirmó los movimientos de los buques chinos mediante datos de Global Fishing Watch (GFW), una organización sin ánimo de lucro que identifica posiciones marítimas a través de señales del Sistema de Identificación Automática (AIS), así como imágenes satelitales.
El primer “muro” de buques chinos fue observado alrededor del 19 de octubre de 2024, frente a la costa oriental de la provincia china de Zhejiang.
La hilera de embarcaciones se extendía a lo largo de los 123,5 grados de longitud este durante más de 100 kilómetros hacia el sur desde un punto situado a 30 grados de latitud norte.
Según GFW, participaron alrededor de 770 buques chinos, y la mayoría permaneció en el mismo lugar durante aproximadamente 24 horas.
El “muro” se creó después de que los ejercicios militares chinos simularan el cerco de Taiwán, que comenzó cinco días antes, el 14 de octubre.
El mayor número de embarcaciones utilizadas en una “muralla” se observó alrededor del 25 de diciembre de 2025. Aproximadamente 2000 embarcaciones crearon una muralla que consistía en dos formaciones en forma de L invertida que se extendían unos 470 km de norte a sur.
Esta formación se produjo pocos días antes de que comenzaran los ejercicios militares chinos el 29 de diciembre, durante los cuales Taiwán fue nuevamente cercado.
Alrededor del 11 de enero de este año, unos 1.400 barcos pesqueros formaron un muro que se extendía aproximadamente 220 km de norte a sur.
Y la cuarta pared, visible alrededor del 2 de marzo, se formó a unos 100 km más al norte, en aguas más cercanas a la región japonesa de Kyushu. La profesora Chisako Masuo, de la Universidad de Kyushu, experta en asuntos marítimos de China, afirmó que estas formaciones involucraban a la milicia marítima, una organización cuasi militar que apoya a las fuerzas armadas chinas. “La milicia marítima china se está entrenando para desplegarse en alta mar”, afirmó. “En caso de disputas con Japón, como por las islas Senkaku, o ante una posible contingencia que involucre a Taiwán, es probable que China despliegue primero a la milicia marítima”.
Señaló que este tipo de operaciones en la zona gris, que utilizan buques pesqueros movilizados, entran en una categoría jurídicamente ambigua según el derecho internacional, y que Japón y Taiwán podrían tardar en responder inicialmente a tales acciones. Según los informes, la milicia marítima china existía antes de la fundación de la República Popular China en 1949.
En el marco de este sistema, los pescadores y otras personas reciben instrucciones de las autoridades militares chinas para llevar a cabo misiones relacionadas con la defensa nacional y la protección de los intereses marítimos. Algunas estimaciones sugieren que hay alrededor de 200.000 miembros en la milicia marítima.
“Soy un miliciano”
Los reporteros del Asahi Shimbun rastrearon las rutas de los barcos pesqueros que formaron el “muro” el 11 de enero. Muchos de los barcos habían regresado a un puerto pesquero en Zhoushan, provincia de Zhejiang.
A principios de febrero, antes del Año Nuevo Lunar, el puerto estaba lleno de barcos pesqueros atracados tras sus faenas. Según los números de identificación pintados en las embarcaciones, los datos de GFW confirmaron que varios de los buques atracados se encontraban en aguas donde se formó el “muro”.
Al ser preguntado sobre la actividad de la milicia, un pescador que ordenaba las redes en cubierta dijo que su embarcación no participó. “Solo participan los buques líderes de cada flota”, dijo.
Según datos de GFW, sus embarcaciones y varias otras zarparon la mañana del 11 de enero. Una de ellas se separó alrededor de las 8 de la noche y se unió al “muro” durante unas ocho horas.
Se reincorporó al grupo después de que la formación se disolviera. Los demás barcos habían continuado pescando ligeramente al sur del “muro”.
Según varios pescadores, un grupo de pesca típico en el Mar de China Oriental consta de entre siete y diez embarcaciones, cada una con una tripulación de entre ocho y nueve personas.
El capitán, generalmente originario de la provincia de Zhejiang, es el propietario del barco, mientras que los demás miembros de la tripulación son trabajadores migrantes de provincias del interior como Anhui y Guizhou. “Soy un miliciano”, dijo un capitán que dirige una flota.
Permitió que los reporteros del Asahi Shimbun subieran a bordo de su barco, que tenía un panel con el juramento de afiliación al Partido Comunista Chino en una de las paredes. Dijo que era el único miliciano entre la tripulación.
“En caso de guerra, los trabajadores migrantes regresarán a sus ciudades de origen, pero yo debo zarpar si así lo ordenan los militares”, dijo.
Dijo que participa en varios días de “entrenamiento militar” según las instrucciones que recibe cada año, normalmente alrededor de agosto.
Según explicó, los participantes reciben una compensación diaria de entre 200 y 300 yuanes (entre 29 y 44 dólares aproximadamente), además del reembolso de los gastos de combustible.
Aunque los datos de GFW mostraron que su embarcación estaba cerca del “muro” el 11 de enero, él afirmó que no llegó a unirse a él.
“No hubo ninguna notificación por parte de los militares para este viaje. Los buques que participan en este entrenamiento deben pertenecer a un grupo diferente”, dijo.
Pretexto para el uso de la fuerza
Masahiro Yumino, exanalista del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores especializado en milicias chinas, afirma que China mantiene un sistema de “movilización de la defensa nacional” que incorpora ampliamente a ciudadanos y recursos.
Yumino afirmó que los departamentos locales de las Fuerzas Armadas Populares supervisan la milicia marítima.
El gobierno chino informó de la presencia de 8 millones de miembros de milicias en todo el país en 2011. Estos han sido desplegados para la seguridad pública en zonas urbanas y rurales, así como para el socorro en casos de desastre.
Yumino estima que solo la milicia marítima cuenta con entre 200.000 y 300.000 miembros.
Sus misiones incluyen el despliegue en zonas en disputa haciéndose pasar por barcos pesqueros comunes, la coordinación con buques de la guardia costera china y la obstrucción o intimidación de buques extranjeros. Se cree que a veces se ordena a los miembros de las milicias marítimas que colisionen con otros barcos.
Jason Wang, director de operaciones de la empresa de inteligencia geoespacial estadounidense ingeniSPACE, que identificó las actividades del “muro” posteriores a diciembre de 2025, dijo que la milicia marítima lleva a cabo labores de recopilación de inteligencia y patrullas, sirviendo como los “ojos y oídos” del ejército chino.
Según explicó, las “murallas” formadas por miles de buques pesqueros podrían bloquear el transporte marítimo comercial y, de hecho, cerrar las rutas marítimas.
“Las actividades de la milicia marítima china no solo tienen como objetivo Taiwán, sino también el transporte marítimo comercial con destino a Japón y Corea del Sur”, dijo Wang.
Estas fuerzas están entrenadas para la interdicción marítima y escenarios de conflicto armado, y podrían interrumpir las rutas utilizadas por los buques petroleros, los buques metaneros y los portacontenedores.
Masuo, de la Universidad de Kyushu, también afirmó que es probable que Japón sea un objetivo principal de estas formaciones de “muralla”, ya que la mayoría de los buques involucrados han partido de la provincia de Zhejiang, que está más cerca de Japón que la provincia de Fujian, situada frente a Taiwán.
Según Masuo, si aumentan las tensiones en torno a las islas Senkaku, en la prefectura de Okinawa, la milicia marítima podría irrumpir en aguas territoriales japonesas o incluso desembarcar en las islas, creando un pretexto para la intervención militar china.
Fuente: https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16589489
CHINA BREAKS THE MAKING AND INSTALLS THE WORLD’S LARGEST FLOATING WIND TURBINE: ENERGY FOR 4,200 HOMES A YEAR
The Asian giant has created a floating platform for this 16-megawatt turbine capable of operating in deep waters and withstanding extreme typhoons.
China has made another bold move in the global race for renewable energy. The Asian country has installed the world’s largest floating wind turbine off the coast of Guangdong, a gigantic marine structure designed to generate electricity in waters too deep for traditional wind farms.
The project, developed by China Three Gorges Corporation, has a capacity of 16 megawatts and can produce around 44.65 million kilowatt-hours per year, enough to supply electricity to approximately 4,200 homes.The installation represents a significant advance for floating offshore wind energy, a technology that seeks to harness the power of ocean areas where conventional turbines cannot be anchored to the seabed.
The new platform, known as Three Gorges Pilot, has been deployed near Yangjiang, in China’s Guangdong province. Unlike traditional offshore wind farms, this structure is not fixed to the seabed but floats on a semi-submersible platform anchored by a complex mooring system.
CHINA ROMPE LA BARAJA E INSTALA LA TURBINA EÓLICA FLOTANTE MÁS GRANDE DEL MUNDO: ENERGÍA PARA 4.200 HOGARES AL AÑO
El gigante asiático crea una plataforma flotante para esta turbina de 16 megavatios capaz de operar en aguas profundas y resistir tifones extremos.
China ha dado un nuevo golpe sobre la mesa en la carrera mundial por las energías renovables. El país asiático ha instalado frente a la costa de Guangdong la turbina eólica flotante más grande del mundo, una gigantesca estructura marina diseñada para generar electricidad en aguas demasiado profundas para los parques eólicos tradicionales.
El proyecto, desarrollado por China Three Gorges Corporation, cuenta con una potencia de 16 megavatios y puede producir alrededor de 44,65 millones de kilovatios-hora al año, suficiente para abastecer de electricidad a unos 4.200 hogares.
La instalación supone un importante avance para la energía eólica marina flotante, una tecnología que busca aprovechar zonas oceánicas donde las turbinas convencionales no pueden anclarse al fondo marino.
La nueva plataforma, conocida como Three Gorges Pilot, ha sido desplegada cerca de Yangjiang, en la provincia china de Guangdong. A diferencia de los parques eólicos marinos tradicionales, esta estructura no está fijada al lecho marino, sino que flota sobre una plataforma semisumergible anclada mediante un complejo sistema de amarres.
El tamaño de la turbina impresiona incluso dentro de la industria energética. El rotor tiene un diámetro de 252 metros y las palas alcanzan más de 270 metros de altura sobre el nivel del mar.
Según la compañía, la estructura está preparada para soportar condiciones extremas, incluidas olas superiores a los 20 metros y vientos de hasta 264 kilómetros por hora, equivalentes a un huracán de categoría 5.
Llevar la energía eólica a aguas profundas
El gran problema de muchos parques eólicos marinos es la profundidad. Las cimentaciones tradicionales solo funcionan en determinadas zonas costeras relativamente poco profundas. Pero esta plataforma incorpora sistemas de estabilización y monitorización diseñados específicamente para minimizar el impacto del oleaje y del viento constante.
Entre las principales innovaciones destaca un cable submarino dinámico de 66 kilovoltios, preparado para transportar electricidad mientras se mueve junto a la estructura flotante.
Además, gran parte del ensamblaje se realizó en tierra firme antes de remolcar la estructura mar adentro, una estrategia que reduce costes y facilita futuras instalaciones similares.
China acelera su dominio renovable
El despliegue de esta gigantesca turbina refuerza el liderazgo chino en infraestructuras energéticas a gran escala. El país lleva años invirtiendo en energía solar, eólica y almacenamiento energético con el objetivo de reducir su dependencia del carbón y dominar las tecnologías renovables del futuro.
La energía eólica flotante todavía representa una pequeña parte del mercado mundial, pero muchos expertos creen que será clave durante las próximas décadas, especialmente para países con costas profundas o poco espacio disponible en tierra.
Published twice per week by Nuevo Poder. Articles and op-eds focusing on geopolitical issues around Indo-Pacific area
Editor: LW, senior fellow of REDCAEM and CESCOS
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